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GILLIAN E. METZGER

THE ROBERTS COURT
AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

Administrative law today is marked by the legal equivalent of mortal
combat, where foundational principles are ﬁercely disputed and basic doctrines are offered up for “execution.”1 Several factors have led
to administrative law’s currently fraught status. Increasingly bold presidential assertions of executive power are one, with President Trump
and President Obama before him using presidential control over administration to advance controversial policies that failed to get congressional sanction.2 In the process, they have deeply enmeshed administrative agencies in political battles—indeed, for President Trump,
administrative agencies are the political battle, as his administration has
waged an all-out war on parts of the national bureaucracy.3 These bold
assertions of administrative authority stem in part from Congress’s
Gillian E. Metzger is Harlan Fiske Stone Professor of Constitutional Law, Columbia Law
School.
Author’s note: Special thanks to Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Olati Johnson, Tom Merrill,
Daphna Renan, and David Strauss for extremely helpful comments and to Dustin Graber and
Charles See for excellent research assistance, including acquiring knowledge of the Chicago
citation style.
1
Kisor v Wilkie, 139 S Ct 2400, 2425 (2019).
2
For examples of “bold attempts to accrete executive power” in both the Obama and
Trump administrations, see Jerry L. Mashaw and David Berke, Presidential Administration in a
Regime of Separated Powers: An Analysis of Recent American Experience, 35 Yale J Reg 549, 550
(2018).
3
See Evan Osnos, Trump vs. the “Deep State,” New Yorker (May 14, 2018), at https://www
.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/05/21/trump-vs-the-deep-state.
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inability to address pressing problems, with political polarization, intense partisanship, and near parity between the main parties often leading
to legislative gridlock.4 The contemporary political climate also means
that ﬁghts over administrative actions have become ﬁerce and unrelenting. Moreover, the combination of these two developments—aggressive administrative advancement of presidential agendas in a deeply
partisan and polarized world—has spurred a signiﬁcant uptick in politically charged administrative law litigation, epitomized by the dramatic expansion in red state and blue state lawsuits challenging executive branch actions they oppose.5 In addition, conservative groups have
put sustained efforts into fostering academic attacks on core features of
administrative government, efforts that have provided the intellectual
scaffolding for today’s doctrinal disputes.6 And, ﬁnally, there is the
Trump administration’s emphasis on selecting judges who are receptive to these conservative attacks on administrative governance in
court.7
A particularly important contributor to administrative law’s contested status is the Roberts Court. The replacement of Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor with Chief Justice Roberts and
Justice Alito brought a new skepticism about administrative government to the Supreme Court. Meanwhile, Justice Scalia and Justice
Thomas did 180 degree turns in their approaches to administrative
law, penning attacks on administrative law decisions they themselves
had authored just a few years earlier.8 Justice Gorsuch’s elevation to
4
See Gillian E. Metzger, Agencies, Polarization, and the States, 115 Colum L Rev 1739,
1748–49, 1757–58 (2015); see also Jody Freeman and David B. Spence, Old Statutes, New
Problems, 163 U Pa L Rev 1, 17–63 (2014) (providing detailed examples of how congressional
gridlock may prompt agencies to use their authority under preexisting statutes to address
newly emerging regulatory challenges).
5
See Lawsuits, State Energy & Environmental Impact Center ( July 31, 2019), at https://
www.law.nyu.edu/centers/state-impact/ag-actions/active-lawsuits (listing 63 active law suits
against the Trump administration, with 34 ﬁled or joined by California and 26 by New York);
Neena Satija, Texas vs. the Feds—a Look at the Lawsuits, Texas Tribune ( Jan 17, 2017), at https://
www.texastribune.org/2017/01/17/texas-federal-government-lawsuits/ (highlighting that the
state of Texas sued the Obama administration 48 times during his two Terms).
6
See, for example, Jane Mayer, Dark Money: The Hidden History of the Billionaires Behind the
Rise of the Radical Right 2–10 (Doubleday, 2016) (describing Charles and David Koch’s extensive funding of anti-administrative political organizations).
7
See Jason Zengerie, How the Trump Administration Is Remaking the Courts, NY Times Mag
(Aug 22, 2018), at https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/22/magazine/trump-remaking-courts
-judiciary.html (describing the judicial appointment process under Trump and the role played
by the Federalist Society).
8
Compare Michigan v EPA, 135 S Ct 2699, 2712 (2015) (Thomas, J, concurring) (Chevron
deference unconstitutionally requires courts to defer to agencies’ interpretations of ambiguous
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the Court added another strident administrative skeptic to the mix,9
and by his ﬁnal Term on the Court even Justice Kennedy had joined
the ranks of administrative law’s critics.10
This judicial skepticism of administrative government, which I
have elsewhere labeled anti-administrativism, is heavily constitutional,
marked by a formalist and originalist approach to the separation of
powers, a deep distrust of bureaucracy, and a strong turn to the courts
to protect individuals against administrative excess and restore the
original constitutional order.11 Several opinions demonstrated these
traits in the lead-up to the 2018 Term, from the Court’s decision in
Free Enterprise Fund v PCAOB striking down double-for-cause removal protection, to Justice Thomas’s concurrence in Department of
Transportation v Association of American Railroads attacking modern
delegation, to Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent in City of Arlington v FCC
rejecting deference to agency jurisdictional determinations, to the many
concurrences in Perez v Mortgage Bankers Association calling deference to
agency regulatory interpretations into question.12 But perhaps the
clearest example is the ongoing debate over Chevron deference, or the
doctrine that a court should defer to a reasonable interpretation of an
ambiguous statutory provision offered by the agency charged with its
implementation.13 The most cited administrative law decision for
decades, Chevron has been under full-blown assault at the Supreme Court
since 2015, when Justice Thomas condemned the practice of courts

statutes) with National Cable & Telecommunications Association v Brand X Internet Services, 545 US
967, 982–83 (2005) (Thomas, J) (requiring courts to defer to reasonable agency interpretations
of ambiguous statutes, even if the court has already interpreted the statute differently). For
Justice Scalia’s changed view on his Auer opinion, see text accompanying notes 30–33.
9
Gutierrez-Brizuela v Lynch, 834 F3d 1142, 1158 (10th Cir 2016) (Gorsuch, J, concurring)
(arguing that Chevron deference is unconstitutional).
10
Pereira v Sessions, 138 S Ct 2105, 2120 (2018) (Kennedy, J, concurring) (ﬁnding the
“reﬂexive deference” exhibited in certain applications of Chevron deference “troubling”).
11
Gillian E. Metzger, The Supreme Court 2016 Term—Foreword: 1930s Redux: The Administrative State Under Siege, 131 Harv L Rev 1, 3–4, 33–46 (2017).
12
Free Enterprise Fund v Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, 561 US 477, 495–99
(2010); Department of Transportation v American Railroads, 135 S Ct 1225, 1246, 1251 (2015)
(Thomas, J, concurring in the judgment); City of Arlington v FCC, 569 US 290, 314 –16 (2013)
(Roberts, CJ, dissenting); Perez v Mortgage Bankers Association, 135 S Ct 1199, 1210–25 (2015)
(concurrences by Alito, Scalia, and Thomas, JJ).
13
Chevron v Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 US 837, 842–43 (1984). See also
United States v Mead, 533 US 218, 226–27 (2001) (limiting Chevron deference in addition to
instances where the agency has the power to issue rules with the force of law and exercised
that authority in issuing the interpretation in question).
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deferring to agency statutory interpretations as violating Article III and
creating unconstitutional delegations.14 Although Thomas made his
argument in an opinion concurring in the judgment that no one else
joined, by Pereira v Sessions three years later there appeared to be at
least four Justices who considered Chevron deference to be constitutionally problematic,15 and the Court itself has not relied on Chevron
deference since 2014.16
Still, a striking feature of the Roberts Court’s anti-administrativism
before the 2018 Term was its largely rhetorical character. Although
several Justices waxed expansively about an out-of-control national
bureaucracy, the most dramatic attacks on the administrative state’s
constitutionality and administrative law were largely restricted to concurrences and dissents. The occasional majority opinions invalidating
administrative arrangements on constitutional grounds were notably
narrow, cabining their analysis with carve-outs and remedial minimalism.17 And the Court was adept in its avoidance tactics, for example,
repeatedly determining that statutes were unambiguous and thereby
sidestepping the need to take on the debate over Chevron’s constitutionality.18 In short, for all of its alarmism about bureaucrats running
amok and assertions that the contemporary administrative state
violates the constitutional order, the Roberts Court hadn’t yet pulled
back signiﬁcantly on administrative governance in practice.
Thus, the increasingly burning question was whether the Roberts
Court was willing to put its might where its mouth was on administrative law, even at the cost of destabilizing long-standing governance
regimes. Or would its anti-administrativism continue to live mainly
at the margins, tamping down perceived administrative law excesses

14

Michigan, 135 S Ct at 2712 (2015) (Thomas, J, concurring).

15

138 S Ct at 2120–21 (Kennedy, J, concurring), id at 2129 (Alito, J, dissenting) (both voicing
concerns with the Court’s treatment of Chevron); Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F3d at 1154–56
(Gorsuch, J, concurring) (questioning whether Chevron violates separation of powers).
16
See Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v Lee, 136 S Ct 2131, 2142 (2016) (applying Chevron
deference to validate Patent and Trademark Ofﬁce rules for inter partes review).
17
18

See Metzger, 131 Harv L Rev at 47–48 & n 278 (cited in note 11).

See, for example, Wisconsin Central Ltd. v United States, 138 S Ct 2067, 2074 (2018); Epic
Systems Corp. v Lewis, 138 S Ct 1612, 1630 (2018); see also Pereira, 138 S Ct at 2121 (Alito, J,
dissenting) (“Here, a straightforward application of Chevron requires us to accept the
Government’s construction of the provision at issue. But the Court rejects the Government’s
interpretation in favor of one that it regards as the best reading of the statute. I can only
conclude that the Court, for whatever reason, is simply ignoring Chevron”).
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without forcing radical changes in administrative law doctrines or received wisdom about the structural constitution? Justice Kavanaugh’s
track record on the D.C. Circuit—the nation’s leading administrative
law court—suggested that he would be amenable to further narrowing and retraction in core administrative law doctrines of deference and
delegation.19 Moreover, the Court granted certiorari in several cases
that raised pointed challenges to basic administrative law precepts,
suggesting that it was ﬁnally willing to put its anti-administrativism
into action.20
Yet administrative law’s denouement did not come. After a Term
rife with important administrative law decisions, established administrative law remains in force, albeit narrowed. Thus, in Kisor v
Wilkie,21 the Court did not overturn the Auer doctrine of deference to
agency regulatory interpretations, although it tempered such deference in signiﬁcant ways. Similarly, in Department of Commerce v New
York,22 the Court ultimately reafﬁrmed and arguably expanded administrative law’s core requirement of reasoned decision making to
include a prohibition on pretextual explanations of agency decisions.
In several other cases, the Court hewed to existing administrative law
frameworks. The case in which the anti-administrativist view gained
the most traction was Gundy v United States,23 where four Justices
signaled sympathy for a full-bore assault on the constitutionality of
broad delegations. Even so, a plurality upheld the measure in question applying the Court’s well-established doctrine on delegation,
and as of this writing it remains unclear (and in my view unlikely)
whether a majority will materialize for a major doctrinal recalibration
on delegation that would call the constitutionality of the administrative state into question.
The 2018 Term cases demonstrate that the Roberts Court is deeply
divided on administrative law. These divisions track clear ideological

19
Christopher J. Walker, Judge Kavanaugh on Administrative Law and Separation of Powers,
SCOTUSBlog ( July 26, 2018), at https://www.scotusblog.com/2018/07/kavanaugh-on
-administrative-law-and-separation-of-powers (summarizing Justice Kavanaugh’s D.C. Circuit opinions on separation of powers and agency deference).
20
See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Kisor v Wilkie, 18-15, ∗i (US ﬁled June 29, 2018);
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Gundy v United States, 17-6086, ∗i (US ﬁled Sept 20, 2017).
21
139 S Ct 2400 (2019).
22

139 S Ct 2551 (2019).

23

139 S Ct 2116 (2019).
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lines. Justice Gorsuch emerged as the voice of the four more conservative Justices this Term, intent on overturning established administrative law doctrines and pulling back on administrative government. Meanwhile Justice Kagan led the four liberal Justices in a
defensive effort, seeking to deter or at least mitigate the conservative
assault. In the middle was Chief Justice Roberts, sharing the conservatives’ suspicion of government and bureaucracy yet resistant to
the dramatic disruption and potential institutional costs to the Court
that Gorsuch’s approach might yield. The cases, particularly Kisor
and Department of Commerce, also illuminate several core analytic
themes and tensions in the Roberts Court’s administrative law jurisprudence. These include recently reemerged philosophical disputes
over the distinction between law and policy as well as more longstanding constitutional disagreements about separation-of-powers
formalism, functionalism, and minimalism. Another central development is an increased historical focus, a development evident in Roberts
Court administrative law opinions from all quarters. This increased
historicism surfaced notably in revived debates over the meaning of
the 1946 Administrative Procedure Act (APA), with originalist and
textualist interpretation of the APA squaring off against a more evolving, common law approach to the statute and administrative law writ
large. Although important, these analytic disagreements are unable on
their own to explain the direction of Roberts Court administrative law.
Among other issues, they map the Court’s ideological divides imperfectly, with some trends spanning both camps and inconsistencies on
both sides.
Taking a further step back, two contrasting frames emerge from
the Roberts Court’s administrative law opinions from the 2018 Term,
building on these analytic tensions. The ﬁrst is formalist in the extreme, insisting on sharp demarcations among the branches and between law and policy. It is also insistently originalist, condemning
contemporary judicial review doctrines as at odds with traditional
understandings of the judicial power and the meaning of the APA.
With its categorical and uncompromising stance, commitment to
limited government and aggressive judicial review, this approach has
the potential to radically transform American governance. That seems
in part its purpose, as this radical frame is accompanied by deep
skepticism about administrative government.
The second frame encompasses Justices with a broader range of
views about constitutional structure and administrative government.
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Most are functionalist and accepting of constitutional evolution, but
at least the Chief Justice (a sometime adherent) is more formalist and
originalist. They also disagree on the extent to which administrative
government poses a serious problem at all, and if it does whether the
concern is the potential for arbitrary agency action or a politically
unaccountable bureaucracy. But what unites them is that they are
unwilling to radically disrupt existing governance regimes, at least not
all at once. Instead, they share a commitment to addressing whatever
problems exist with administrative government by gradually ﬁnetuning doctrine. The central characteristic of this approach is therefore its incremental, common law character. The impact of this incrementalist approach is harder to discern, given both the variation
within its ranks and the longer time horizon needed to assess incremental change. It also leaves lower courts greater room to apply administrative law as they see ﬁt, which could yield more pullback in
administrative law or its continued preservation, depending on the
orientations of lower court judges. Like its radical cousin, this incrementalist frame could result in a substantial pullback in administrative
power, but it would have this effect through a more subconstitutional
and statutory interpretation guise and over a longer period of time.
In assessing the future impact of Roberts Court administrative law,
the most important factor may be this tension between radicalism and
incrementalism. Which of these analytic frames will ultimately prevail still remains an open question, but incrementalism was plainly the
victor in the 2018 Term’s administrative law decisions. That is signiﬁcant, but should also not obscure that there was unity across the
Court in urging greater judicial scrutiny of administrative action.
Moreover, despite invocations of the importance of bureaucratic expertise, these decisions share the concerns with unaccountable, aggrandized, and arbitrary administrative power that characterize the
Roberts Court’s administrative jurisprudence more widely.
That administrative power is expansive is indisputable, as is the
possibility that such power can be abused. Yet the Roberts Court’s
portrayal of administrative government is strikingly incomplete. Notably lacking is reference to the ways that the administrative state
operates to constrain power, render it accountable, and advance individual liberty. The lack of such an afﬁrmative account reinforces
the sense that the goal of Roberts Court administrative law may be
to pull back on government for its own sake, rather than to better
achieve constitutional values. Absent a more balanced view of the

8

THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW

[2019

administrative state, the Roberts Court is unlikely to develop a coherent approach to administrative law.
Part I of what follows discusses the 2018 Term’s administrative
law cases, looking in detail at the two decisions addressing judicial
review of agency decision making, Kisor v Wilkie and Department of
Commerce v New York. Part II then elucidates several key analytic
tensions underlying these decisions and the Roberts Court’s administrative law jurisprudence writ large, while Part III assesses what the
2018 Term decisions portend for the future of administrative law.
I. Administrative Law in the 2018 Term
Administrative law took center stage in the 2018 Term. A
range of cases presented the Court with opportunities to remake
doctrine, opportunities that the Court for the most part declined. In
some instances, the Court took a minimalist approach, invoking established doctrine to resolve relatively noncontroversial issues and
punting the difﬁcult questions back to the lower courts.24 In others,
the Court engaged more forthrightly with contentious administrative law issues, albeit ultimately sidestepping dramatic changes.25
Two administrative law decisions deserve special attention: Kisor v
Wilkie and Department of Commerce v New York. Both were prominent
cases that centered on the core and much disputed issue of judicial
deference to administrative determinations. Both also involved a
majority afﬁrming the principle of deference as well as existing deference doctrines, and thus they too are instances in which the Court

24
See Weyerhaeuser Co. v Fish & Wildlife Service, 139 S Ct 361, 369, 371–72 (2018)
(remanding question of whether property requiring some modiﬁcation to support a species
can count as habitat and whether the Secretary had acted arbitrarily in assessing the costs and
beneﬁts of designing property not currently occupied by frog species as habitat); see also PDR
Network v Carlton & Harris Chiropractic, 139 S Ct 2051, 2055–56 (2019) (remanding for court
of appeals to determine whether the FCC order at issue was a legislative or interpretive rule
and whether the petitioner had a “prior” and “adequate” opportunity to obtain judicial review
of the order).
25
Gundy v United States, 139 S Ct 2116 (2019), is a prime example. There, Justice Kagan, id
at 2129–30 (Kagan, J) (plurality), and Justice Gorsuch, id at 2133–37, 2143–45 (Gorsuch, J,
dissenting), battled directly over the constitutionality of congressional delegations of policymaking authority to administrative agencies. The radical potential of the case lies in the fact
that Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas joined Gorsuch’s dissent and Justice Alito
penned a concurrence indicating his willingness to reconsider nondelegation doctrine, id at
2130 (Alito, J, concurring in the judgment). But these were, in the end, a dissent and a concurrence, and a majority upheld the speciﬁc delegation challenged there under the existing
intelligible-principle test.
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avoided dramatic change. Together, these two cases offer an illuminating window on recurring themes and tensions in the Roberts
Court’s approach to administrative law.
a. kisor v wilkie
Factually, Kisor arose from a veteran’s repeated efforts to get disability beneﬁts from the Department of Veterans Affairs. Jurisprudentially, the background to Kisor lay in a 2011 concurrence by Justice Scalia, where he criticized the practice of giving deference to
agency interpretations of their own regulations.26 Known as either
Seminole Rock deference (after a 1945 decision setting out the doctrine27) or more recently as Auer deference (after a 1997 decision reafﬁrming the doctrine28), this doctrine provides that courts should
defer to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulation unless the
interpretation is “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation” or there is some other “reason to suspect that the interpretation
does not reﬂect the agency’s fair and considered judgment on the
matter in question.”29 Despite having authored Auer for a unanimous
Court fourteen years earlier, Justice Scalia argued in 2011 that “it
seems contrary to fundamental principles of separation of powers to
permit the person who promulgates a law to interpret it as well” and
expressed concern “that deferring to an agency’s interpretation of its
own rule encourages the agency to enact vague rules which give it the
power, in future adjudications, to do what it pleases.”30 A majority of
the Court cited Justice Scalia’s concerns the next year in Christopher v
SmithKline Beecham Corporation, when it refused to grant Auer deference to the Department of Labor’s (DOL) new interpretation of Fair
Labor Standards Act regulations, an interpretation DOL had offered
in amicus briefs without prior notice to regulated parties.31
Justice Scalia reiterated and expanded his criticism of the doctrine
in 2013 in Decker v Northwest Environmental Defense Center, where he
picked up two additional votes (Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito)

26

Talk America Inc. v Michigan Bell Co., 564 US 50, 67–68 (2011) (Scalia, J, concurring).

27

Bowles v Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 US 410, 413–14 (1945).

28

Auer v Robbins, 519 US 452 (1997).
Id at 461–62.

29
30

Talk America, 564 US at 68 (Scalia, J, concurring).

31

567 US 142, 159–61 (2012).
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for his call to reconsider Auer deference.32 And in 2015, in Perez v
Mortgage Bankers Association, Justice Scalia further argued that Auer
deference also violated the Administrative Procedure Act.33 Justice
Thomas, now fully on board, wrote an even longer opinion arguing
that Auer was unconstitutional because it “represents a transfer of judicial power to the Executive Branch, and . . . amounts to an erosion of
the judicial obligation to serve as a ‘check’ on the political branches.”34
Justice Alito also signaled his sympathy with these views, describing
them as “offer[ing] substantial reasons why the Seminole Rock doctrine may be incorrect.”35 But the focus of Perez was on invalidating,
as “contrary to the clear text of the [APA],” the D.C. Circuit’s requirement that agencies undertake notice-and-comment rulemaking
before signiﬁcantly changing a deﬁnitive interpretation of a rule.36 The
Perez majority was content to relegate the Auer issue to a footnote,
responding simply that “[e]ven in cases where an agency’s interpretation receives Auer deference, . . . it is the court that ultimately decides
whether a given regulation means what the agency says. Moreover, Auer
deference is not an inexorable command in all cases.”37
Perez sparked concerted efforts by business groups and conservative organizations to get a case seeking to overrule Auer before the
Court.38 In one such case, involving the Department of Education’s
interpretation of its rules to require public schools to allow transsexual
students to use the gender bathroom of their choice, certiorari was
granted but ultimately dismissed when the Trump administration
rescinded the interpretation.39 Finally, however, with Kisor they scored
the legal vehicle of their dreams. Kisor involved about as sympathetic a
plaintiff as one could ﬁnd: a former Marine, still suffering from his
32

568 US 597, 615 (2013) (Scalia, J, concurring in part and dissenting in part).

33

135 S Ct 1199, 1211–12 (2015) (Scalia, J, concurring in the judgment).

34

Id at 1217 (Thomas, J, concurring in the judgment).
Id at 1210 (Alito, J, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).

35
36

Id at 1206.

37

Perez, 135 S Ct at 1208 n 4.
See Brief Amici Curiae of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America,
Garco Construction Inc. v Secretary of the Army, No 17-225, ∗2–3 (US ﬁled Sept 11, 2017) (cert
denied) (requesting the Court to reconsider Auer); Brief Amici Curiae of American Action
Forum et al, United States Aid Inc. v Bible, No 15-861, ∗3 (US ﬁled Feb 3, 2016) (cert denied)
(calling for the overruling of Auer); Brief Amici Curiae of Cato Institute et al, Gloucester
County School Board v GG, No 16-273, ∗4 (US ﬁled Sept 27, 2016) (case resolved on other
grounds) (taking no position on the merits but urging the Court to overrule Auer).
38

39

Gloucester County School Board v GG, 137 S Ct 1239 (2017) (mem).

1]

ROBERTS COURT AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

11

service in Vietnam, wrongly denied disability beneﬁts when he ﬁrst
applied in 1982 and then subsequently unable to recoup beneﬁts
retroactively because the agency deemed the new service records he
supplied not “relevant” for purposes of a VA regulation governing
when the agency could reconsider an earlier beneﬁts denial.40 Moreover, the Court granted certiorari solely on the question of whether
Auer deference should be overruled.41 The general consensus from
both Auer’s critics and its defenders was that the Court was poised to
overrule the doctrine.42
But that didn’t happen. Instead, the Court, by a 5–4 vote, declined
to overrule Auer. Justice Kagan’s majority opinion defending Auer
deference was joined in full by the three other liberal Justices, but
Chief Justice Roberts—who provided the crucial ﬁfth vote—joined
only in part. Meanwhile Justice Gorsuch, concurring only in the
judgment and joined by the three other conservative Justices, assumed the role of Auer’s prime attacker, complaining that “[i]t should
have been easy for the Court to say goodbye to Auer.”43 Justice Kavanaugh, joined by Justice Alito, also wrote separately.
1. Justice Kagan and the limits on Auer deference. At ﬁrst glance,
Justice Kagan’s opinion has a slightly schizophrenic air. She led with
Auer’s virtues, emphasizing several reasons why it makes sense to
presume that Congress, having delegated power to an agency to implement a statute through rulemaking, would also intend to delegate
power to resolve ambiguities in those rules. “In part, that is because
the agency that promulgated a rule is in the ‘better position to reconstruct’ its original meaning”;44 in part, it is because agencies are
more expert and politically accountable than courts; and in part, it is
40

38 CFR § 3.156(c)(1).

41

Kisor, 139 S Ct at 2408–09.

42

See, for example, Gillian Metzger, The Puzzling and Troubling Grant in Kisor, SCOTUSblog
( Jan 30, 2019), at https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/01/symposium-the-puzzling-and-troubling
-grant-in-kisor/ (describing the grant in Kisor as part of a conservative effort to overrule Auer and
“troubling for what the case may portend about how the Roberts Court, with its newly cemented
conservative majority, views the administrative state”); Kimberly Hermann, The Supreme Court
and the Forgotten “Three Ring Government,” SCOTUSblog ( Jan 29, 2019), at https://www.scotusblog
.com/2019/01/symposium-the-supreme-court-and-the-forgotten-three-ring-government
/ (stating that “[t]he Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether it should overrule Auer
and Seminole Rock” and that “[a] number of Supreme Court opinions . . . suggest that the court
will answer that question with a ‘yes’”).
43
44

Kisor, 139 S Ct at 2425 (Gorsuch, J, concurring in the judgment).

Id at 2412 (plurality) (quoting Martin v Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission,
499 US 144, 152 (1991) (internal additions omitted)).

12

THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW

[2019

because deferring to agency interpretations yields greater uniformity
and consistency in interpretations than having courts exercising independent judgment.45 But her most central point—what Kagan
termed “the core theory of Auer deference”46—was that “sometimes
the law runs out and policy-laden choice is what is left over.”47 And
“Congress . . . is attuned to the comparative advantages of agencies
over courts in making such policy judgments.”48 Moreover, she emphasized that ambiguity in regulations is inevitable; although at times
the result of “careless drafting,” ambiguity often instead “reﬂects the
well-known limits of expression or knowledge.”49
Justice Kagan then ended her opinion by rebutting at length the
many attacks made against Auer deference. One such attack, raised by
Kisor and by Justice Gorsuch in dissent, was that judicial deference to
agency regulatory interpretations violates § 706 of the APA, which
provides that “the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions
of law . . . and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of
an agency action.”50 Kagan argued that courts comply with § 706 even
when they grant Auer deference, both because they apply extensive
independent review before deciding to defer and because courts are
determining the meaning of a rule by deferring when they conclude
that Congress delegated authority to interpret the rule to the agency
which promulgated it.51 She further defended Auer’s constitutionality by insisting that courts still “retain a ﬁrm grip on the interpretive
function,” agencies exercise executive power rather than judicial power
when they interpret, and the combination of legislative, judicial, and
executive functions in agencies had long been upheld.52 She also
dismissed the claim that Auer deference creates poor agency incentives “to issue vague and open-ended regulations,” maintaining that it
45

Id at 2410–14 (Kagan, J) (plurality).

46

Id at 2415 (Kagan, J) (plurality).

47

Kisor, 239 S Ct at 2415 (Kagan, J) (plurality).
Id at 2413 (Kagan, J) (plurality).

48
49
50

Id at 2410 (Kagan, J) (plurality).
5 USC § 706.

51
Kisor, 139 S Ct at 2419–20 (Kagan, J) (plurality). She further insisted that deference does
not give an interpretive rule the binding effect that the APA limits to legislative rules for
which § 553 demands notice-and-comment procedures, emphasizing again the independent
review that courts undertake before deciding to defer and the restriction of Auer deference to
“an agency’s authoritative and considered judgments” served § 553 values. Id at 2420–21
(Kagan, J) (plurality).
52

Id at 2421–22 (Kagan, J) (plurality).
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“does not survive an encounter with reality.”53 Finally, Kagan argued
strongly for retaining Auer deference on stare decisis grounds.54
In between these powerful defenses of Auer deference, however,
Justice Kagan elaborated a multitude of limits that signiﬁcantly constrain when Auer deference applies. First, Auer deference is only triggered in cases of “genuin[e] ambigu[ity],” which means not just surface ambiguity but the type of ambiguity that remains after a court has
rigorously applied the traditional tools of statutory interpretation. In
addition, the agency must offer a reasonable interpretation, and the
interpretation must be one that represents the agency’s “authoritative” view, “implicates its substantive expertise,” reﬂects its “fair and
considered judgment,” and does not “create unfair surprise to regulated parties.”55 This long list closely parallels the “signiﬁcant limits”
on Auer deference that the Solicitor General advocated in his Kisor
brief.56 And it led Justice Gorsuch, in concurring in the judgment, to
chastise the majority for retaining Auer deference only in a “maimed,”
“enfeebled,” and “zombiﬁed” form.57 That may go too far, but Chief
Justice Roberts and Justice Kavanaugh have a point in claiming that
the distance between Justice Kagan’s opinion retaining Auer and
Justice Gorsuch’s dispensing with it “is not as great as it may initially
appear.”58 Certainly that was true in the case at hand, for Kagan ultimately concluded that the lower court “jumped the gun in declaring
the [VA’s] regulation ambiguous” and suggested that the nonprecedential agency interpretation at issue—one of 80,000 issued by 100
judges sitting singly each year—might well not be the type of considered, authoritative interpretation needed for Auer deference to
apply.
A reader is left wondering whether Auer deference is really as
beneﬁcial as Justice Kagan makes it out to be—and if it is, why on
earth the majority doesn’t let it have broader sway. One obvious

53
Id at 2421 (Kagan, J) (plurality) (noting not only the lack of empirical evidence to
support this claim, but also that agencies have all sorts of practical incentives to be clear).
54
Id at 2422 (Kagan, J) (plurality).
55

Kisor, 139 S Ct at 2414–18 (internal quotations and citations omitted).

Brief for the Respondent in Opposition, Kisor v Wilkie, No 18-15, ∗12 (US ﬁled Feb 25,
2019).
56

57
58

Kisor, 139 S Ct at 2425 (Gorsuch, J, concurring in the judgment).

Id at 2424 (Roberts, CJ, concurring in part); see also id at 2448 (Kavanaugh, J, concurring in the judgment).
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explanation for this tension in Justice Kagan’s opinion is Chief Justice
Roberts. He concurred only in the parts of Kagan’s opinion setting
out Auer’s limits, arguing that Auer deference should be retained on
stare decisis grounds, and reversing for reconsideration of whether
Auer deference should be applied here. Put differently, only four Justices were willing to state that Auer deference yields beneﬁts or conforms to Congress’s expectations and the APA. Why Roberts was
unwilling to join more of Kagan’s opinion is difﬁcult to explain, given
that he had previously argued that the courts’ law-declaring role
under the Constitution and the APA can be compatible with deference to agency legal interpretations.59 But in light of his stance, the
limits Kisor imposed on Auer deference appear to be the necessary
price to have Auer retained by a majority at all.
Although the need to secure Roberts’s vote no doubt played an
important role in shaping the majority opinion, it would be a mistake
to view Kagan’s cabining of Auer as simply strategic. To begin with,
Kagan herself offered a different account, arguing that the limits are
prerequisites for securing the beneﬁts of Auer deference and not
impediments to that goal. As she put it, the presumption that Congress
would want a court to defer to an agency’s interpretation would not be
justiﬁed absent ambiguity or “when a court concludes that an interpretation does not reﬂect an agency’s authoritative, expertise-based,
fair or considered judgment.”60 In addition, Kagan contended that
these limits were ones that the Court had already recognized in its
prior Auer jurisprudence. Moreover, as a legal academic Justice Kagan
had argued strongly in favor of limiting deference to interpretations
meaningfully reviewed and personally offered by the agency ofﬁcial to
whom Congress had delegated authority over the relevant administrative action.61 Kagan wrote there about Chevron deference, but an
obvious linkage exists to her argument here that Auer deference should
be limited to “authoritative” and “considered” agency regulatory interpretations. Indeed, in many ways Kisor represents the importation of
Chevron/Mead analysis into the Auer context: The Kisor limits add a

59
See City of Arlington, 569 US at 316–17 (Roberts, CJ, dissenting) (arguing that deference
is compatible with the court’s law-declaring role provided Congress had delegated interpretive authority to agencies).
60
61

Kisor, 139 S Ct at 2414 (Kagan, J) (plurality) (internal additions and citations omitted).

David J. Barron and Elena Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 Supreme Court
Review 201, 235, 238–39 (2001).
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Mead Step Zero, identifying certain contexts in which Auer deference
is not even potentially available, and also a rigorous Chevron Step One
inquiry, in which a court must determine if sufﬁcient ambiguity exists to trigger Auer deference.62
These defenses of Kisor’s limits are only partially successful. It is
true that the Court already had “cabined Auer’s scope in varied and
critical ways,”63 but the Court certainly expanded on these limits in
Kisor. More importantly, Kagan papered over the evident tensions
between the limits she articulated and the justiﬁcations she offered
for Auer deference. Take, for example, Kagan’s argument that agencies are more expert and politically accountable than courts, and thus
Congress would likely consider agencies better positioned to make
the policy judgments that resolving regulatory ambiguity requires.64
Surely this institutional competency argument for deference also extends to instances in which agencies change their interpretations,
even at the cost of unfair surprise, provided agencies provide a reasoned explanation for the change. Yet Kagan rejected deference in
such circumstances. And while a good case can be made that Congress
would not intend deference when the text of a rule is clear, it is hardly
obvious that Congress would want courts to work hard to resolve
seeming ambiguities on their own, rather than to defer to agencies
once some ambiguity becomes apparent. After all, agencies’ greater
expertise and knowledge of the rule likely makes them better positioned to determine when ambiguity actually exists, as well as to resolve that ambiguity once identiﬁed. Kagan also downplayed the costs
that Auer’s limits may carry, in particular the way that a more case-bycase assessment of relevant factors increases uncertainty for regulated
parties and agencies alike. Gorsuch underscored this point,65 and it is

62
Kisor, 139 S Ct at 2414–18 (listing limits and noting the parallel to Chevron/Mead ); see
Thomas W. Merrill, The Mead Doctrine: Rules and Standards, Meta-Rules and Meta-Standards,
54 Admin L Rev 807, 812–19 (2002) (outlining the Chevron/Mead framework and describing
the multiple factors Mead identiﬁed as relevant in determining if deference applies); see also
Kristin E. Hickman and Mark R. Thomson, The Chevronization of Auer, 103 Minn L Rev
Headnotes 103, 107 (2019) (arguing, pre-Kisor, that “[a] multi-step Auer doctrine is emerging . . .
that mirrors the several steps and complexity of . . . Chevron deference”).
63
Kisor, 139 S Ct at 2418. Along with other administrative law professors, I made this point
in a brief to the Court in Kisor. See Brief of Administrative Law Scholars in Support of
Afﬁrmance, Kisor v Wilkie, No 18-15, ∗11–13 (US ﬁled Mar 4, 2019).
64

Kisor, 139 S Ct at 2413 (Kagan, J) (plurality).

65

Id at 2445 (Gorsuch, J, concurring in the judgment).
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one that Kagan had previously acknowledged,66 yet she largely ignored it here.
This is not to say that the limits Justice Kagan imposed on Auer
deference are indefensible, but rather that their underlying rationale
does not and cannot lie solely in congressional intent. Instead, these
limits stem from normative and functional concerns—in particular,
fairness to regulated parties, the need for a check on agency power,
ensuring expert decision making, and encouraging political accountability. In her past life as an academic, Kagan was open about how
deference doctrines “arise from and reﬂect candid policy judgments . . .
about the allocation of interpretive authority.”67 But in Kisor she
avoided forthright engagement with the conﬂicting concerns at work
in constructing deference doctrines. Take again the example of changed
agency interpretations: Such interpretations often reﬂect transformations in administrative policy stemming from change in political control
of the executive branch, yet they risk undercutting legitimate reliance.
In Kisor, Justice Kagan plainly prioritized reliance over electoral accountability, but we are left to wonder why.68
2. Justice Gorsuch’s contrasting vision. Justice Gorsuch provided a
very different take on Auer deference, recounting in detail what had
become the standard litany of Auer’s sins. He maintained that Auer
deference was a historical aberration plainly at odds with the APA’s
judicial review and procedural requirements. In his view, § 706’s “unqualiﬁed command requires the court to determine legal questions—
including questions about a regulation’s meaning—by its own lights.”
Hence, a “court that, in deference to an agency, adopts something
other than the best reading of a regulation . . . is abdicating the duty
Congress assigned to it.”69 And Auer “effectively nulliﬁes the distinction” Congress drew between notice-and-comment rules that
carry the force of law and interpretive rules that do not.70 In the face
66
Barron and Kagan, 2001 Supreme Court Review at 225–27 (cited in note 61) (emphasizing burdens that a case-by-case approach to Chevron deference impose on agencies).
67

Id at 203.
One possible reason is that agencies can still achieve policy change; they simply must
change the underlying legislative rule through notice-and-comment rulemaking to do so.
Justice Gorsuch offered this argument. See Kisor, 139 S Ct at 2442 (Gorsuch, J, concurring in
the judgment). But Kagan rejected such a procedural requirement on the ground (also articulated in Perez) that the APA does not impose notice-and-comment rulemaking requirements on interpretive rules. Id at 2420 (Kagan, J) (plurality).
68

69

Id at 2432 (Gorsuch, J, concurring in the judgment).

70

Id at 2434 (Gorsuch, J, concurring in the judgment).
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of such “clear statutory commands,” he argued, it made no sense to
presume that Congress “really, secretly, wanted courts to treat agency
interpretations as binding.”71 He argued equally forcefully that Auer
violates Article III and the separation of powers “by coopt[ing] the
judicial power,” and uniting “the powers of making, enforcing and
interpreting the laws . . . in the same hands,” thereby compromising
“a cornerstone of the rule of law.”72 Underlying these statutory and
constitutional arguments was Gorsuch’s rejection of Kagan’s equation of law and policy. Such an equation “contradicts a basic premise
of our legal order: that we are governed not by the shifting whims of
politicians and bureaucrats, but by written laws whose meaning is
ﬁxed and ascertainable.”73 Left out of this portrayal is the possibility
that the alternative to agency deference might actually be governance
by the shifting whims of life-tenured federal judges, as they struggle
to give meaning to complicated and indeterminate laws.
A particularly notable contrast lies in the two opinions’ views of
agencies. For Justice Kagan, agencies are expert bodies assigned public responsibilities by Congress and inevitably confronted with regulatory ambiguity.74 For Justice Gorsuch, they are biased actors who
are no different than self-interested private parties and will exploit ambiguity to their own advantage.75 For Kagan, agencies’ political aspect is a positive feature, helping to ensure that the administrative
state remains accountable; for Gorsuch, it means that Auer deference
threatens the constitutional structure by elevating “raw political executive power” over the Constitution’s promise of an independent
and impartial judiciary.76 These divergent views suggest very different understandings of the administrative state. Implicit in Kagan’s
opinion is a positive account of administrative government and the
beneﬁts of expert and accountable regulation; the image she repeatedly referred to was of the FDA and its expertise when it comes

71

Id at 2435 (Gorsuch, J, concurring in the judgment).

72

Kisor, 139 S Ct at 2439–40 (Gorsuch, J, concurring in the judgment) (emphasis omitted).
Id.

73
74

Id at 2410, 2413, 2421 (Kagan, J) (plurality).

75

Compare id at 2425–26; see also id 2442–43 (Gorsuch, J, concurring in the judgment)
(noting agency expertise as a basis for taking agency views seriously, but not for deference
because agencies may be wrong).
76
Compare Kisor, 139 S Ct at 2413 (Kagan, J) (plurality), with id at 2439–40 (Gorsuch, J,
concurring in the judgment).
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to identifying active moieties.77 Justice Gorsuch explicitly articulates
a darker vision, one under which the “explosive growth of the administrative state [and regulations] over the last half-century”
means that the “mischief” and “cost” of Auer deference have “increased dramatically.”78
In addition, where Justice Kagan’s defense of Auer is qualiﬁed and
cabined, Justice Gorsuch’s attack on the doctrine is uncompromising
and absolute. Yet at times Gorsuch’s arguments seem overdone.
From his opinion it is hard to understand how the Court could ever
have been so benighted to adopt Auer deference in the ﬁrst place, let
alone adhere to it for decades and preserve it for the future. Or take
Gorsuch’s attack on “the majority’s attempt to remodel Auer’s rule
into a multi-step, multifactor inquiry [that] guarantees more uncertainty and much litigation.”79 Although the uncertainty generated by
Kisor is a valid point, Gorsuch insisted in the same breath that the
better approach would be to apply the notoriously fuzzy doctrine of
Skidmore deference—under which the weight given an agency’s interpretation of a regulation would depend on the factors that give it
“power to persuade.”80 On a clarity and certainty scale, Kisor’s domesticated version of Auer and Skidmore deference are hardly worlds
apart.
Ultimately, Gorsuch insisted that Kisor’s afﬁrmance of Auer is
“more a stay of execution than a pardon,” all but inviting future
challenges until the Court “ﬁnd[s] the nerve . . . [to] inter Auer at
last.”81 By thus vowing continued resistance, Gorsuch may have done
more to guarantee ongoing uncertainty and dispute than the majority’s new limits did. And with the disruptive stakes of efforts to
77
Id at 2410, 2413 (plurality). Under an FDA regulation, pharmaceutical companies receive exclusive rights to drug products if they contain “no active moiety that has been approved by FDA in any other” new drug application. 21 CFR § 314.108(a) (2010). Kagan
emphasized the difﬁcult questions that interpreting this regulation entails, such as whether
“[a company has] created a new ‘active moiety’ by joining a previously approved moiety to
lysine through a non-ester covalent bond.” Kisor, 139 S Ct at 2410 (Kagan, J) (plurality).
Speaking with conviction, she added that “[i]f you are a judge, you probably have no idea of
what the FDA’s rule means.” Id at 2413 (Kagan, J) (plurality).
78
Kisor, 139 S Ct at 2446–47 (Gorsuch, J, concurring in the judgment).
79

Id at 2447 (Gorsuch, J, concurring in the judgment).

80

Id at 2447–48 (Gorsuch, J, concurring in the judgment); Skidmore v Swift & Co., 323 US
134, 140 (1944) (listing relevant factors for extending deference); Richard W. Murphy, A New
Counter-Marbury: Reconciling Skidmore Deference and Agency Interpretive Freedom, 56 Admin L
Rev 1, 41 (2004) (describing the “fuzzy” nature of Skidmore analysis).
81

Kisor, 139 S Ct at 2425–26 (Gorsuch, J, concurring in the judgment).
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overturn Auer thus clariﬁed, it is not surprising that stare decisis became the decisive issue in the case.
3. Stare decisis, Auer deference, and Chevron. Kisor was one of many
cases in the 2018 Term in which stare decisis emerged as a central
point of contention among the Justices.82 What made Kisor unusual
is that stare decisis concerns carried the day here—and even more,
did so over the contention that stare decisis was categorically inapplicable to deference doctrines.
Both Justice Kagan and Justice Gorsuch offered standard stare
decisis arguments. Kagan’s main stare decisis claim was that overruling Auer deference would cause great disruption because the doctrine represents a “long line of precedents . . . going back 75 years or
more” and “pervades the whole corpus of administrative law. . . . It is
the rare overruling that introduces so much instability into so many
areas of law, all in one blow.”83 Kagan’s argument on this score was
helped by the fact that both Kisor’s attorney and the Solicitor General had acknowledged that overturning Auer would open up many
precedents to reconsideration.84 She also emphasized that Congress
was free to overrule Auer but had not done so, suggesting that Auer
deference should enjoy the same high level of stare decisis accorded
statutory constructions.85 Gorsuch, for his part, drew on a litany of
established grounds for rejecting stare decisis, insisting that Auer
deference was accidental, never justiﬁed, unworkable, at odds with
norms of legal interpretation, and not a doctrine on which private
parties had relied.86
But their main bone of contention centered on how Auer deference
should be viewed. Justice Kagan framed Auer deference as a substantive doctrine and inseparable (at least categorically) from the
results reached in speciﬁc cases where it is applied.87 Justice Gorsuch
did not seriously dispute the disruptive impact of overruling Auer if

82
Stare decisis to Supreme Court precedent was discussed in ﬁve cases in the 2018 Term,
including Kisor. See Knick v Township of Scott, 139 S Ct 2162 (2019); Franchise Tax Board v
Hyatt, 139 S Ct 148 (2019); Gamble v United States, 139 S Ct 1960 (2019); Stokeling v United
States, 139 S Ct 544 (2019).
83

Kisor, 139 S Ct at 2422.

84

Id.
Id.

85
86

Id at 2445–47 (Gorsuch, J, concurring in the judgment).

87

Id at 2410–14 (Kagan, J) (plurality).
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viewed in substantive terms. But he rejected this framing, arguing
that the better analogy is to see Auer as an interpretive methodology,
like the “proper weight to afford to historical practice in constitutional cases or legislative history in statutory cases,” which the Court
does not regard as “binding future Justices with the full force of horizontal stare decisis.”88 Gorsuch based this claim on the fact that Auer
does not “purport to settle the meaning of a single statute or resolve
a particular case” but instead claims “to prescribe an interpretive methodology governing every future dispute.”89
Neither Justice Kagan’s nor Justice Gorsuch’s arguments on this
front are fully satisfying. As Randy Kozel has maintained, deference
doctrines fall somewhere in between decisions addressing speciﬁc
substantive interpretations and interpretive methodologies.90 It is
analytically possible, if smacking of ipse dixit, to overrule Auer while
still according stare decisis effect to speciﬁc decisions reached in reliance on Auer. In addition, Gorsuch has a point in arguing that Auer’s
breadth of application means that applying stare decisis here has a
greater constraining effect on judges than granting stare decisis to
speciﬁc interpretations.91 On the other hand, Gorsuch’s further suggestion that congressional efforts to tell courts how to review agency
interpretations may unconstitutionally intrude on judicial independence is a more radical proposition than he acknowledged and unsupported by current case law.92 It would call much of § 706 of the
APA into question, for example, as that provision consists entirely of
congressional instructions to courts on how to review agency action.93
88
Id at 2444 (Gorsuch, J, concurring in the judgment). Whether interpretive methodologies are as optional as Gorsuch claims is debatable; Gorsuch himself suggests that one
reason to get rid of Auer is that the doctrine is at odds with currently governing norms of
interpretation that give little weight to congressional intent. Id at 2442 (Gorsuch, J, concurring in the judgment). Whether they should be optional is debatable as well. Compare
Abbe Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and
the New Modiﬁed Textualism, 119 Yale L J 1750 (2010), with Evan J. Criddle and Glen
Staszewski, Against Methodological Stare Decisis, 102 Georgetown L J 1573 (2014).
89

Kisor, 139 S Ct at 2444 (Gorsuch, J, concurring in the judgment).

90

Randy J. Kozel, Statutory Interpretation, Administrative Deference, and the Law of Stare
Decisis, 97 Tex L Rev 1125, 1128 (2019).
91
Kisor, 139 S Ct at 2444 (Gorsuch, J, concurring in the judgment) (claiming that stare
decisis in the Auer context would dictate “the interpretive inferences that future Justices must
draw in construing statutes and regulations that the Court has never engaged”).
92
93

Id at 2439–40 (Gorsuch, J, concurring in the judgment).

See 5 USC § 706; Merrill, 54 Admin L Rev at 823 (cited in note 62) (explaining that the
Court’s precedents in Christensen v Harris County, 529 US 576 (2000), and United States v
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On the whole, Kagan’s identiﬁcation of Auer as a substantive
doctrine is more persuasive than Gorsuch’s effort to analogize it to
a method of interpretation. To begin with, Gorsuch’s effort to equate
Auer with an interpretive methodology is hard to square with the
Court’s practice of treating deference doctrines as mandatory. Prior
to the current attack on Auer and Chevron, the Court did not debate
whether or not those frameworks governed its review of agency regulatory and statutory interpretations; instead, the Justices’ disagreements centered on questions internal to the frameworks, such as
whether the relevant regulatory or statutory texts were ambiguous.94
And while vertical stare decisis raises issues about the Supreme
Court’s superintendence of lower federal courts that are absent from
horizontal stare decisis, it merits note that the Court does not portray
deference doctrines as optional for lower courts to follow. To the contrary, the Court has reversed lower courts for mistakes in their application of these doctrines.95 Of course, that an approach represents the
Court’s current practice does not immunize it from criticism and
change, but current practice should carry particular weight in stare
decisis assessments.
In addition, Gorsuch’s suggestion that transsubstantive doctrines
should not trigger stare decisis would have a dramatic impact on administrative law. Administrative law is transsubstantive to its core. Although many of its transsubstantive doctrines are ultimately rooted in
the APA or another statute, they frequently represent substantial judicial development from that statutory basis.96 As a result, rejecting
stare decisis for transsubstantive doctrines could open up the ﬁeld to
fundamental transformation. That links Gorsuch’s rejection of stare

Mead, 533 US 218 (2001), “make it clear that Congress has the authority to turn Chevron
deference on and off”). For an argument that Congress lacks power to enact mandatory rules
of statutory interpretation, see Larry Alexander and Saikrishna Prakash, Mother May I?
Imposing Mandatory Prospective Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 20 Const Comm 97, 99–100
(2003).
94
See, for example, MCI Telecommunications Corp. v American Telephone & Telegraph Co.,
512 US 218 (1994), where the majority and dissent disagreed over whether the phrase “modify
any requirement” was sufﬁciently ambiguous to warrant Chevron deference.
95
Decker, 568 US 597 (2013) (reversing the Ninth Circuit for failing to apply Auer deference to an agency interpretation of a rule); Entergy Corp. v Riverkeeper Inc., 556 US 208
(2009) (reversing the Second Circuit for failing to grant Chevron deference to the EPA’s
choice to use cost-beneﬁt analysis).
96
Gillian E. Metzger, Embracing Administrative Common Law, 80 Geo Wash L Rev 1293,
1295–97 (2012).
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decisis to the rest of his opinion and its broad invocation of constitutional ﬁrst principles to oppose Auer deference. It also supports
Kagan’s insistence that rejection of Auer deference would be profoundly disruptive; the arguments for overturning Auer are not easily
cabined to the context of agency regulatory interpretations but would
extend to other deference contexts and other instances in which agencies combine legislative, executive, and adjudicatory functions.
The potential implications of Kisor for other administrative law
doctrines was driven home by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kavanaugh, both of whom insisted in their concurrences that the decision in Kisor did not resolve the propriety of Chevron deference to
agency statutory interpretations.97 These statements are puzzling.
Stare decisis should be at least as much of a concern for Chevron
deference, if not more so, given Chevron’s greater centrality to administrative law.98 Moreover, it is hard to see why the formalist argument that granting agencies interpretive power unconstitutionally
intrudes on the judicial power would be any different between Auer
and Chevron. Indeed, Justice Thomas and then-Judge Gorsuch have
penned opinions castigating Chevron deference in exactly the same
terms.99 Given that this argument failed to obtain majority support
in Kisor, logically it should also fail to get majority support in a case
addressing Chevron. Further reinforcing the parallels between the
two deference doctrines, the Court already has curtailed Chevron deference in ways similar to the limits imposed on Auer deference in Kisor,
such as requiring more evidence that an interpretation is authorized
and more judicial probing before concluding that ambiguity exists.100
Perhaps Roberts and Kavanaugh simply did not want to be read as
answering the question of Chevron’s status in a case addressing Auer,
97
Kisor, 139 S Ct at 2425 (Roberts, CJ, concurring in part); id at 2449 (Kavanaugh, J,
concurring in the judgment).
98
Indeed, in Perez, 135 S Ct at 1212–13 (Scalia, J, concurring in the judgment). Justice
Scalia argued that stare decisis counted more strongly for retaining Chevron deference than
Auer deference.
99
See Michigan v EPA, 135 S Ct 2699, 1712–14 (2015) (Thomas, J, concurring); GutierrezBrizuela v Lynch, 834 F3d 1142, 1149–52 (10th Cir 2016) (Gorsuch, J, concurring).
100
See, for example, Mead, 533 US at 226–27 (emphasizing limits on Chevron’s applicability, in particular that “Congress [have] delegated authority to the agency generally to make
rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority”) and Wisconsin Central Ltd. v United States, 138 S
Ct 2067, 2074 (2018) (concluding that the statutory text in question was “clear enough . . . ,
leaving no ambiguity for the agency to ﬁll”). Indeed, Justice Kagan noted this similarity. See
Kisor, 139 S Ct at 2414 (Kagan, J) (plurality) (citing Mead, 533 US at 229–31).
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but were not signaling they would reach a different result. Alternatively, they may have wanted to preserve room to pull back further
on Chevron’s across-the-board presumption of implied congressional
delegation of authority to agencies to ﬁll gaps and resolve ambiguities in the statutes they administer. This would ﬁt their prior jurisprudence; in particular, Roberts has argued that questions addressing
jurisdiction or matters of “deep economic and political signiﬁcance”
should not receive Chevron deference, and Kavanaugh has rejected
Chevron deference for agency authority to issue major rules.101 If so,
they might continue to support Chevron deference to agency interpretations when expressly authorized by Congress or when they view
statutory terms as plainly granting deference. Another possible reason
for their statements is that, unlike Auer, Chevron deference grants an
agency interpretive authority over Congress’s handiwork and not the
agency’s own regulations. Although Justice Scalia viewed this feature
as making Auer deference more suspect because it allowed agencies
to self-delegate power,102 one could argue that the opposite is true.
On this view, Chevron is the greater threat to the constitutional order
because it elevates agencies over Congress and in the process removes
statutes as critical external checks on agencies’ claims to power. If
adopted, this argument would most strongly call Chevron deference
into question, but for that reason it is hardest to square with both
Justices’ willingness to grant Chevron deference in the past.
b. department of commerce v new york
Judicial deference to agency decision making was also at the heart
of Department of Commerce. But that was where the parallels between
these two cases ended. Department of Commerce lacked a Supreme
Court jurisprudential lead-up akin to that in Kisor. Similarly lacking
were calls for a fundamental reconsideration of existing doctrine; to
the contrary, the different opinions in Department of Commerce sought
to outdo each other with their adherence to governing frameworks.

101
See King v Burwell, 135 S Ct 2480, 2489 (2015) (refusing to apply Chevron deference to a
question of deep economic and political signiﬁcance absent express indication from Congress
that it wanted the agency to have such interpretive authority); United States Telecom Association
v FCC, 855 F3d 381, 417–18 (DC Cir 2017) (Kavanaugh, J, dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (arguing that there must be clear congressional authorization for major
agency rules).
102

See Decker, 568 US at 619–21 (Scalia, J, concurring and dissenting in part).
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Most striking, however, was the changed position of the different
Justices, with the Justices who urged overturning Auer here arguing
for substantial deference to agency policy choices, and those who
defended Auer here advocating subjecting agency decision making to
greater scrutiny.
At issue in Department of Commerce was Commerce Secretary
Wilbur Ross’s decision in March 2018 to add a question about citizenship to the 2020 census. Doing so went against the strong advice
of the Census Bureau in the Department of Commerce. Ever since
1950, the bureau has argued against adding a citizenship question to
the census form that went to most households, out of concern that the
question would lower response rates and generate false claims of citizenship that would undercut the census’s accuracy. Moreover, bureau ofﬁcials maintained that better citizenship data were available
from other administrative records, including the American Community Survey, which the bureau sends every year to a small percentage
of U.S. households on a rotating basis.103 Ross ultimately opted for an
approach that would include a citizenship question on the census as
well as draw on administrative records. In explaining his decision to
add the question—and in testifying to Congress—Ross repeatedly
emphasized that the Department of Justice (DOJ) needed censusblock citizenship data to enforce the Voting Rights Act and had
submitted a letter asking for the question’s inclusion.104
Litigation immediately followed, with two of the lawsuits being
consolidated in federal district court in New York City. The case was
unusual from the start. It quickly became evident that the initial administrative record submitted to the court was, to put it kindly, sparse.
On its own initiative, the government supplemented the record with a
brief memo from Ross indicating not only that Ross had sought to
include a citizenship question well before DOJ’s request, but also that
DOJ had only made the request at Commerce’s prodding. These revelations caused the district court to order the government to complete the administrative record, which led to over 12,000 pages of new
103
Department of Commerce, 139 S Ct at 2562; Joint Appendix Volume I, Department of
Commerce v New York, No 18-966, ∗104–06 (US ﬁled Mar 6, 2019) (Memo of John M.
Abowd); Brief of Former Census Bureau Directors, Department of Commerce v New York,
No 18-966, ∗2–4 (US ﬁled Apr 1, 2019).
104
Joint Appendix Volume III, Department of Commerce v New York, No 18-966, ∗956 (US
ﬁled Apr 1, 2019) (Ross testimony to Congress); Joint Appendix Volume I, Department of
Commerce v New York, No 18-966, ∗546 (US ﬁled Mar 6, 2019).
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material being added.105 In addition, the district court granted the
plaintiffs’ motion for extra-record discovery and depositions, including of Secretary Ross, after concluding that the new record material
strongly suggested that the plaintiffs would ﬁnd evidence showing that
Ross acted in bad faith.106 These discovery disputes were the basis for
the case’s ﬁrst appearance at the Supreme Court in October 2018,
where the Court stayed Ross’s deposition but let the rest of the extrarecord development go forward, over a dissent by Justices Gorsuch
and Thomas.107 The district court proceeded to issue a mammoth
178-page opinion just three months later, enjoining addition of the
citizenship question on the grounds that Secretary Ross’s decision
violated the Census Act and was arbitrary and capricious, and further
that the Secretary’s explanation for why he had added the question
was pretextual.108 The Supreme Court immediately jumped back in,
taking the uncommon step of granting the government’s request for
certiorari before the court of appeals heard the case and making the
case a late addition to the 2018 Term.109
Much of this speed and early Supreme Court involvement can be
put down to fast-approaching deadlines for printing the census, but
also reﬂected the case’s high-proﬁle status and clear political ramiﬁcations. The states and localities challenging the decision to add a
citizenship question were blue jurisdictions with substantial noncitizen populations that stood to lose representation and funds from
undercounting minorities. Those supporting the administration were
red jurisdictions that would gain from an undercount elsewhere.110 In
addition, adding the citizenship question echoed strongly with the
Trump administration’s harsh stance on unlawful immigration and

105
Department of Commerce, 139 S Ct at 2564; Appendix to Petition for Writ of Certiorari,
Department of Commerce v New York, No 18-966, ∗546a (US ﬁled Jan 25, 2019).
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See New York v Department of Commerce, 333 F Supp 3d 282, 285–86 (SDNY 2018); New
York v Department of Commerce, 2018 WL 5260467 ∗2 (SDNY 2018).
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In re Department of Commerce, 139 S Ct 16 (Oct 22, 2018).
New York v Department of Commerce, 351 F Supp 3d 502, 515–16 (SDNY 2019).
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For a discussion of the Solicitor General’s recent efforts to get cases to the Supreme
Court extremely quickly, including in Department of Commerce, see Stephen I. Vladeck, The
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with Republican efforts to draw electoral districts based on citizenship voting age population—a move that a leading Republican redistricting strategist described as “advantageous to Republicans and
Non-Hispanic Whites” and argued “would clearly be a disadvantage
for the Democrats.”111 Fittingly, the drama surrounding the case reached
an even greater pitch once it was revealed after oral argument that this
same strategist had urged Ross to add the question and ghostwritten
the DOJ letter. That the strategist’s involvement emerged only because his estranged daughter happened to ﬁnd the documents in his
ﬁles after his death was just icing on the cake.112
1. Chief Justice Roberts’s split opinion. Chief Justice Roberts was
again the pivotal vote in the case but here wrote the majority opinion.
Like Kagan’s opinion in Kisor, Roberts’s majority opinion has a split
personality. Roberts was joined by four Justices—Thomas, Alito,
Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh—in concluding that Secretary Ross’s decision to add the question was not arbitrary and capricious and did
not violate the Census Act. And he was also joined by four Justices,
but a different four—Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan—in
concluding that the decision nonetheless had to be remanded because
the explanation Ross provided was pretextual.113
The split character of Roberts’s opinion shows even more in his
tone and reasoning. Most of the opinion treated Ross’s decision as a
perfectly reasonable and historically grounded policy choice. Roberts
began with a brief description of the role and history of the census,
emphasizing that “[e]very census between 1820 and 2000 (with the
exception of 1840) asked at least some of the population about their
citizenship or place of birth.”114 Roberts proceeded to give Secretary
Ross every possible beneﬁt of the doubt and then some. For example,
111
Letter of Respondents New York Immigration Coalition et al Notifying Court of New
Proceedings in the District Court, Department of Commerce v New York, No 18-966 (US ﬁled
May 30, 2019); The Use of Citizen Voting Age Population in Redistricting, New York v
Department of Commerce, No 1:18-cv-02921-JMF, Exhibit D ∗6, 9 (SDNY ﬁled May 30,
2019) (Hofeller Letter), https://www.commoncause.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/2019
-05-30-Letter-Motion-dckt-587_1.pdf. See also Justin Levitt, Citizenship and the Census, 119
Colum L Rev 1355 (2019).
112
Michael Wines, Deceased G.O.P. Strategist’s Hard Drives Reveal New Details on the Census
Citizenship Question, NY Times (May 30, 2019), at https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/30/us
/census-citizenship-question-hofeller.html. See also La Union Del Pueblo Entero v Ross, 771 F
Appx 323 (4th Cir 2019) (remanding to the district court for further proceedings in light of
the Hofeller Letter).
113

Department of Commerce, 139 S Ct at 2555.

114

Id at 2561.

1]

ROBERTS COURT AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

27

where the district court and Justice Breyer’s partial dissent criticized
Ross for failing to take into account the Census Bureau’s assessment
that adding a citizenship question would harm the accuracy of the
census, Roberts underscored uncertainties in the bureau’s analysis.
Roberts even went so far as to suggest that it was “inconclusive”
whether adding the question would depress census response rates at
all, despite the Census Bureau’s own conclusions to the contrary. This
framing allowed Roberts to portray Ross’s decision as a paradigmatic
example of the type of “value-laden decision making and the weighing of incommensurables under conditions of uncertainty” to which
courts owe deference.115 Not only was “the choice between reasonable
policy alternatives in the face of uncertainly . . . the Secretary’s to make,”
but also Ross’s choice was “reasonable and reasonably explained, particularly in light of the long history of the citizenship question on the
census.”116
Then in the ﬁnal Part V of his opinion, Roberts dramatically
changed his tune. Here Roberts took the evidentiary record at face
value and rejected the government’s entreaties to exclude the extrarecord material, concluding that ultimately the district court was
justiﬁed in adding it. Far from being a reasonable decision maker in
the face of uncertainty, Ross was now portrayed as having a closed
mind from the get-go: “Th[e] evidence showed that the Secretary was
determined to reinstate a citizenship question from the time he entered ofﬁce . . . [and] instructed his staff to make it happen.”117 Worse,
that evidence showed that Ross’s “VRA enforcement rationale—the
sole stated reason [for adding the citizenship question]—seems to
have been contrived,”118 was “incongruent with . . . the record,”119 and
simply “a distraction.”120 Or, put with less ﬁnesse, the record showed
that Ross had lied. By deﬁnition, that meant he had acted unreasonably, for “[a]ccepting contrived reasons would defeat the purpose”
of courts requiring agencies to provide reasoned explanations for their
actions.121
115
116

Id at 2571.
Id.
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Roberts’s invalidation of Ross’s decision as pretextual stands in
sharp contrast to his majority opinion just a year before in Trump v
Hawaii.122 There, Roberts wrote for a 5–4 Court sustaining a ban on
travel to the United States from a number of countries, almost all of
which were majority Muslim, despite substantial evidence suggesting
the ban was animated by anti-Muslim bias. This evidence included
the proverbial smoking gun—numerous statements by President Trump
and his advisors demonstrating such bias and arguing for a Muslim ban
or identifying the travel ban as a Muslim ban—as well as a process used in
issuing the initial version of the ban that deviated substantially from
usual practice.123 Yet other than recounting this history, Roberts limited his analysis to the face of the ban and the process used to produce
the version of the ban that was before the Court.124 In Hawaii, Roberts
emphasized that the travel ban implicated national security matters
over which courts owed the President particular deference, and the
absence of such matters in Department of Commerce may help explain
his greater scrutiny here. Yet as both Justices Thomas and Alito argued, the census is also a context in which the executive branch enjoys
substantial discretion, but that did not preclude Roberts from invalidating on pretext grounds.
On the other hand, the split character of Roberts’s opinion in
Department of Commerce brings to mind another Roberts opinion, the
one he wrote in 2012 in NFIB v Sebelius. There, too, Roberts alternated between his conservative and liberal colleagues, agreeing with
the former that the individual mandate of the Affordable Care Act
(ACA) fell outside the constitutional scope of Congress’s commerce
or necessary and proper powers but joining with the latter to hold
that the ACA nonetheless was a constitutional tax.125 And the same
institutional legitimacy concerns that motivated Roberts in NFIB126
appear to have played a role here, as signaled by Roberts’s statement that the Court did not have to “exhibit a naivete from which
ordinary citizens are free” in concluding that Ross’s claimed rationale
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138 S Ct 2392 (2018).
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Id at 2435–40 (Sotomayor, J, dissenting).
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Id at 2420–23.
National Federation of Independent Business v Sebelius, 567 US 519 (2012).
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Joan Biskupic, The Chief: The Life and Turbulent Times of Chief Justice John Roberts 248
(Basic Books, 2019) (claiming that concerns for the institutional legitimacy of the Court
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of wanting to support VRA enforcement was pretextual.127 To sanction
Ross’s decision in the face of such evident deception and partisanship
risked the Court being viewed as simply a political institution, much
the way invalidating the signal Democratic political achievement in a
generation might have done.128 Reports that Roberts changed his
stance on pretext after oral argument, while the drama surrounding
the case was growing outside the Court, adds support to the conclusion that institutional legitimacy concerns animated his position.129
Yet this legitimacy account does not really explain the split character of Roberts’s opinion. Why risk having the Court appear political
by defending the Trump administration’s decision to add a citizenship question, only to conclude that this decision was pretextual and
therefore invalid? If Roberts’s goal was to give each side something to
mute criticism of the Court, he was no more successful here than in
NFIB; in both cases his opinions sparked strong partial dissents and
critical public response.130 An alternative explanation for Roberts’s
split opinion is that he believed the pretextual problem with Ross’s
decision was curable. This explanation ﬁts with Roberts’s decision to
remand and his emphasis that the Court was “not hold[ing] that the
agency decision here was substantively invalid.”131 But it is harder to
square with Roberts’s conclusion that the only reason Ross had offered for adding the question—enhanced VRA enforcement—was
not an actual reason for his decision. That conclusion, pivotal to
Roberts’s determination that Ross’s explanation was pretextual, made
it very hard to see how the pretext problem could be cured without
undertaking an entirely new decision-making process.132 But the
127
Department of Commerce, 139 S Ct at 2575 (quoting United States v Stanchich, 550 F2d
1294, 1300 (2d Cir 1977) (Friendly, J)).
128
Biskupic, The Chief at 233 (cited in note 126) (noting that Roberts disliked the initial
partisan lineup to strike down the ACA).
129
See Joan Biskupic, How John Roberts Killed the Census Citizenship Question, CNN (Sept 12,
2019), at https://www.cnn.com/2019/09/12/politics/john-roberts-census-citizenship-supreme
-court/index.html.
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Solicitor General had long maintained that the census form had to be
ﬁnalized by the end of June to meet the deadlines for conducting the
census in 2020, which would not allow leeway for anything more than
a pro forma stamp on remand.133 Not only would such a pro forma
approach fail to cure the pretext the Court had identiﬁed, but upholding such a pro forma process after remand would make the Court
look worse than if it had just upheld the decision initially. As a result,
the pretext ruling meant the end of the Trump administration’s effort
to add a citizenship question to the 2020 census, as DOJ attorneys
soon concluded and ultimately so did the Attorney General and the
President.
2. The administrative record, pretext, and arbitrary and capriciousness
review. Reﬂecting the split nature of Roberts’s opinion, there were
strong partial dissents from the other Justices on each side, as well as
from Justice Alito, who argued that judicial review was inappropriate
because the content of the census was “committed to agency discretion by law.”134 Put together, the Department of Commerce opinions
represent an administrative law smorgasbord, addressing a range of
difﬁcult questions concerning pretext in administrative contexts, the
nature of the administrative record, the scope of arbitrary and capriciousness review, and the proper balance of politics and expertise in
administrative contexts. Yet, strikingly, none of the opinions acknowledged the difﬁculty of the issues addressed and instead treated the
answers they gave as dictated by existing precedent and indisputable.
Justice Thomas, joined by Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh, condemned the Court’s invalidation of Ross’s decision on pretext grounds
as “unprecedented” and a dangerous “departure from our deferential
review of discretionary agency decisions.”135 He insisted that pretext
was simply not a relevant inquiry under arbitrary and capriciousness
review and that the record did not establish pretext in any event.
Thomas also chastised the Court for “proceeding beyond the administrative record,” warning that the effect of doing so was to provide a

judgment which an administrative agency alone is authorized to make, must judge the propriety of such action solely by the grounds invoked by the agency.”).
∗
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new “avenue of attack” for opponents of executive branch actions,
which would “allow partisans to use the courts to harangue executive
ofﬁcers through depositions, discovery, delay, and distraction.”136
Thomas’s concerns about courts going outside the record resonate
in existing case law. A venerable line of administrative law jurisprudence emphasizes that “the focal point of judicial review should be
the administrative record already in existence, not some new record
made initially in the reviewing court.”137 After initially allowing court
supplementation in instances when more formal ﬁndings were lacking, the Court’s past case law had quickly moved to the view that when
a reviewing court considers the agency record to be inadequate in
some way, “the proper course, except in rare circumstances, is to remand to the agency for additional investigation of explanation.”138
Thomas’s sudden solicitude for effective governance is surprising,
given the extent to which he has dismissed similar functionality concerns in his recent administrative law opinions.139 Still, his point on this
score is well taken. In an era in which litigation is the prime means by
which partisans on both sides seek to derail executive branch actions
they oppose, allowing extra-record supplementation risks further
hampering of effective government administration.
Yet the issue of the district court’s extra-record supplementation
was largely a sideshow here. Neither the discovery nor the depositions that the district court ordered in Department of Commerce ended
up mattering all that much.140 Instead, what was pivotal was the material the government supplied to complete the administrative record
per a stipulation with the plaintiffs. The district court found that
this material alone demonstrated that Ross’s decision was arbitrary
and capricious and pretextual.141 Although Roberts invoked the wider
universe of both completed-record and extra-record material, he too
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emphasized that the completed-record material on its own created
the “strong showing of bad faith or improper behavior” sufﬁcient to
justify extra-record supplementation under the Court’s restrictive
precedents.142
Notably, neither Roberts’s majority opinion nor Thomas’s partial
dissent address the question of what should be included in the administrative record in the ﬁrst place. The proper answer to this question is not clear in informal proceedings such as the decision making
here, where agencies are not limited to considering materials in a
formal record.143 The APA states that judicial review should be undertaken based on the “whole record” without deﬁning what counts
as the record: Is it the record provided to the court, the record that the
agency considered or relied upon in making its decision, or the record
of all the material before the agency? Lower courts take different
approaches to this question.144 Moreover, practical and functional
concerns point in different directions. Limiting judicial review to the
record provided to a court or that the agency relied on risks giving
agencies incentives to include and consider only materials supporting their decisions, but including all the material before the agency or
all the material the agency considered risks producing a massive record that is highly burdensome to generate, overwhelms courts, and
obscures the main bases of the agency’s decision making.145 Roberts
avoided this issue by relying on the fact that the government had not
challenged the district court’s conclusion that the administrative record was incomplete and stipulated to the addition of substantial new
142

Department of Commerce, 139 S Ct at 2574–76.

143

The requirement of on-the-record decision making means that identifying the record is
not an issue with respect to formal proceedings. See 5 USC § 556(e); Jeffrey S. Lubbers, A
Guide to Federal Agency Rulemaking 287–302 (ABA, 5th ed 2012).
144
See Travis O. Brandon, Reforming the Extra-Record Evidence Rule in Arbitrary and Capricious Review of Informal Agency Actions: A New Procedural Approach, 21 Lewis & Clark L Rev
981, 997–98, 1000–01, 1008–09 (2017); Aram A. Gavoor and Steven A. Platt, Administrative
Records and the Courts, 67 Kansas L Rev 1, 62–69 (2018). In 2013, the Administrative Conference of the United States issued a report and recommendations on best practices for the
compilation, preservation, and certiﬁcation of administrative records and also guidance on
when courts can seek supplementation. See Recommendation 2013–14 —Administrative Record in Informal Rulemaking, 78 Fed Reg 41352, 41358 ( July 10, 2013), at https://www.acus
.gov/research-projects/administrative-record-informal-rulemaking.
145
See Brandon, 21 Lewis & Clark L Rev at 1012–17 (cited in note 144) (arguing in favor
of supplementing the record provided “the plaintiff provides reasonable proof that the agency
considered the evidence” as “practical and workable”); Gavoor and Platt, 67 Kansas L Rev at
69–75 (cited in note 144) (listing negative consequences to allowing supplementation with
other evidence considered by the agency).

1]

ROBERTS COURT AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

33

material.146 Yet the result in Department of Commerce may make the
government less willing to do so in the future.
Justice Thomas’s insistence that pretext inquiries are strangers to
administrative law is also only partially correct. It’s true that arbitrary
and capriciousness review does not usually speak in terms of pretext
and the Supreme Court had not previously held agency action arbitrary and capricious on pretext grounds.147 But Thomas downplays
the way that arbitrary and capriciousness review serves to identify
pretextual decision making without calling it such. Take, for instance,
Motor Vehicle Association v State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance, the
case that set out the modern arbitrary and capriciousness standard.
There, the National Highway Trafﬁc and Safety Administration had
justiﬁed rescinding its automotive passive restraint rule entirely on
the grounds that the rule would not achieve predicted safety beneﬁts.
In overturning that rescission, the Court emphasized obvious regulatory alternatives that should have been explored if the agency really
were trying to advance safety, as the governing statute required.148
The Court did not put its holding in terms of pretext, instead concluding that the agency was not acting reasonably to achieve its safety
goals. However, an implicit corollary of concluding that an agency’s
policy undercuts its stated goals is that those goals probably weren’t
really motivating the agency in the ﬁrst place. Chief Justice Rehnquist’s partial dissent in State Farm highlighted this point, accusing
the majority of going too far in overturning the agency out of a
concern that the agency’s decision was actually driven by political
considerations.149 Moreover, approaching pretext as part of a general
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arbitrary and capriciousness review has the advantage of forestalling
the need for an extra-record investigation into a decision maker’s
subjective motivations, thereby addressing Thomas’s concerns about
such inquiries. It similarly avoids the need for courts to specify the
extent to which political considerations can legitimately affect agency
action, a notoriously difﬁcult line to draw and one courts have long
evaded.150
Of course, approaching pretext as part of general arbitrary and
capriciousness review will fail to police against pretextual rationales in
contexts where the agency’s action is otherwise well supported.151 Yet
that seems a worthwhile trade-off; at least absent allegations that the
undisclosed rationale is invidious, the burdens of extra-record investigation into pretext are harder to defend when the agency action
is independently supportable. The real risk in this context is that this
independent support will turn out to be manufactured or insubstantial. But that risk can be mitigated by subjecting stated agency rationales to more skeptical and probing scrutiny in the face of evidence of
pretextual decision making.
Hence, this surrogate role of arbitrary and capriciousness review
highlights again the oddity of Chief Justice Roberts’s split opinion,
combining highly deferential review of the substantive basis for adding the citizenship question with invalidation of the decision on pretextual grounds. Justice Breyer’s partial dissent provided the skeptical
scrutiny that Roberts’s opinion lacked, closely examining evidence in
the record about the impact of the question on different groups. He
concluded that the administrative record established that adding the
question would only impose costs and yield no beneﬁts; it would “diminish the accuracy of the enumeration of population” while at the
same time “produce citizenship data that is less accurate, not more.”152
contexts. See Jennifer Nou, Census Symposium: A Place for Pretext in Administrative Law?,
SCOTUSBlog ( June 28, 2019), at https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/06/census-symposium
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And he rejected the Secretary’s use of uncertainty as a basis for discounting the Census Bureau’s estimates of harmful effects, arguing
that uncertainty is endemic in regulatory contexts and does not excuse
an agency from not at least explaining why it decided to “tak[e] action
without ‘engaging in a search for further evidence.’”153
Despite their very different applications of arbitrary and capriciousness review, both Roberts and Breyer, as well as Thomas and
Alito, invoked State Farm as guiding their analyses. Whether State
Farm and the Court’s arbitrary and capriciousness precedents require searching scrutiny is a matter of scholarly dispute,154 and there
are many decisions in which courts stress uncertainty and take a more
forgiving stance, as the Supreme Court did here.155 The broader
point is that arbitrary and capriciousness scrutiny is malleable, with
judges able to dial their scrutiny up and down based on their assessments of contextual factors in a particular case. For his part, Breyer
underscored this malleability, insisting that “[c]ourts do not apply
these principles of administrative law mechanically. Rather, they take
into account . . . the nature and importance of the particular decision,
the relevance and importance of missing information, and the inadequacies of a particular explanation in light of their importance.”156
3. Politics, deference, and discretion. What then led some Justices in
Department of Commerce to dial down their scrutiny of the substantive
reasonableness of Ross’s decision making and others to dial it up?
Several factors appeared to be in play, most centrally politics and
discretion.
Politics surfaced most prosaically in Justice Thomas’s opinion,
with Thomas repeatedly accusing the district court of invalidating
the citizenship question out of bias against the Trump administration. Thomas insisted that only bias could explain the district court’s
153
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detailed record review and ﬁndings of pretext: “I do not deny that
a judge predisposed to distrust the Secretary or the administration
could arrange those facts [from the record] on a corkboard and—with
a jar of pins and a spool of string—create an eye-catching conspiracy web.”157 That three Supreme Court Justices signed onto such a
pointed attack on the impartiality of a lower court judge is extraordinary, all the more so given that ﬁve of their colleagues agreed with
the district court’s analysis, at least in part. It is also deeply ironic, for
by launching this attack these Justices were themselves embedding a
partisan message in the pages of the U.S. Reports. After all, the prime
expositor of the claim that lower court judges who rule against the
Trump administration’s actions are doing so out of bias is President
Trump himself.158
But politics also appeared in a more principled form, in differing
views of the relationship between political accountability and deference to agency policy-making. For Roberts, such deference rests fundamentally on principles of political accountability. Provided the policy choices of an agency’s political leaders are at least plausible, they
should be respected. Contrary views of career bureaucrats should get
little weight, if not be viewed with outright suspicion. As he put it, “the
Census Act authorizes the Secretary, not the [Census] Bureau, to
make policy choices within the range of reasonable options.”159 Indeed, a desire to reafﬁrm the importance of judicial deference to the
policy choices of agencies’ political leadership seems the best explanation of Roberts’s decision that adding the citizenship question per
se was not arbitrary and capricious, even as he invalidated Ross’s decision as pretextual. Roberts also made a point of underscoring the
legitimacy of political inﬂuence in his discussion of pretext, insisting
that “a court may not set aside an agency’s policymaking decision
solely because it might have been inﬂuenced by political considerations or prompted by an Administration’s priorities.”160 One beneﬁt
157
Id at 2582 (Thomas, J, concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also id at 2576
(Thomas, J, concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[T]he decision of the district court . . .
was transparently based on the application of an administration-speciﬁc standard. . . . The law
requires a more impartial approach.”).
158
Adam Liptak, Trump Takes Aim at Appeals Court, Calling It a “Disgrace,” NY Times
(Nov 20, 2018), at https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/20/us/politics/trump-appeals-court-ninth
-circuit.html?modulepinline.
159
Department of Commerce, 139 S Ct at 2571 (claiming that Breyer “subordinat[ed] the
Secretary’s policymaking discretion to the Bureau’s technocratic expertise”).
160

Id at 2573.
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of Roberts’s split vote is that it allowed him to reinforce this structural principle of political control of policy while still protecting the
Court from sanctioning blatant manipulations and falsehoods.
Justice Breyer, by contrast, tied deference for discretionary agency
decisions closely to expertise and carefully reasoned explanation.
He treated the fact that Ross deviated from the recommendations of
the agency’s in-house experts, the Census Bureau, as grounds for a
probing judicial reception.161 Breyer did not deny that an agency
head’s “policy choice between two reasonable but uncertain options”
would deserve deference.162 But he argued that the Census Bureau’s
memos showed that the option of adding the question was not reasonable and the extent of uncertainty was exaggerated.163 Indeed, far
from viewing political accountability as compelling deference here,
Breyer argued that letting Ross’s decision stand risked “undermining
public conﬁdence in the integrity of our democratic system itself,”
given the importance of an accurate census for political representation.164 Interestingly, Justice Breyer and the liberal Justices concurring with him appeared far more amenable to connecting politics and
deference in Kisor. There, they joined Kagan’s opinion tying deference to authoritative interpretations by agency heads and identifying political accountability as a basis for deference. This divergence
is potentially explainable on the grounds that Kisor did not involve a
conﬂict between political accountability and expertise, but unfortunately the contrast was never addressed by Breyer—leaving the impression that opposition to adding the citizenship question may have
animated his more stringent scrutiny here.
Similarly, the conservative Justices’ emphasis on political accountability as grounds for deference seems in tension with Justice Gorsuch’s identiﬁcation of the political nature of agency decision making as counting strongly against deference in Kisor. Justice Thomas
explained the difference between the two cases as lying in the nature of the agency decision at issue: a discretionary policy choice versus an interpretation of law.165 Whereas deference to agency legal
161

Id at 2589–92 (Breyer, J, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Id at 2593 (Breyer, J, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Department of Commerce, 139 S Ct at 2592–93 (Breyer, J, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Id at 2585 (Breyer, J, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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interpretations violated Article III, deference to agency discretionary
decisions reﬂected “a ‘presumption of regularity’” for the Executive
out of “respect for a coordinate branch of government whose ofﬁcers not only take an oath to support the Constitution, as we do, . . .
but also are charged with faithfully executing our laws.”166 Justice Alito
went even further, arguing that the broad discretion Congress gave the
Secretary of Commerce over the content of the census meant that
courts had no jurisdiction to review the Secretary’s decision making
at all.167
Although this emphasis on discretion helped align the conservative
Justices’ stances in Department of Commerce and Kisor, it highlighted
a conﬂict between Department of Commerce and Gundy. In Gundy,
Justice Gorsuch’s dissent—joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas—argued strongly that broad congressional delegations
of authority to the executive branch were unconstitutional: Congress can delegate to the executive power to “ﬁll up the details” once
“Congress had announced the controlling general policy”; Congress
can also delegate fact-ﬁnding responsibilities and assign “wide discretion” over matters in which the executive independently enjoys
broad authority, such as foreign affairs.168 But what Congress cannot
do is delegate to the executive power to “make the policy judgments”
incorporated in “generally applicable rules of conduct governing future actions by private persons.”169 Plainly, the responsibilities delegated to the Secretary under the Census Act are far more policy laden
than just fact-ﬁnding, and decades of dispute over including a question on citizenship make clear that adding it cannot be seen as just
ﬁlling up the details of the census either. Responsibility for the census
is constitutionally assigned to Congress and not an area of inherent
executive authority. Moreover, private persons are required to ﬁll out
the census, and the fact that not responding to the census is considered a misdemeanor170 creates another parallel to Gundy, though the
criminal consequences of violating the statute at issue there were far

166
Id at 2579–80 (Thomas, J, concurring in part and dissenting in part) (internal quotations
omitted). See also Michigan, 135 S Ct at 2712 (Thomas, J, concurring) (arguing that deference on legal questions violates Article III).
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Id at 2597 (Alito, J, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Gundy, 139 S Ct at 2136–37 (Gorsuch, J, dissenting).
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Id at 2133, 2141 (Gorsuch, J, dissenting).
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more severe. In short, the breadth of discretion given to the Secretary
that the conservative Justices relied on to justify deference in Department of Commerce appears to be precisely the kind of delegation
that several of them would have held unconstitutional in Gundy.171
Yet they never acknowledged, let alone explained, this inconsistency.
II. The Many Isms of Roberts Court Administrative Law
The Roberts Court is clearly conﬂicted when it comes to administrative law. Kisor and Department of Commerce showcase a Court
divided on administrative law substance and methodology, with the
Justices diverging notably even when they ostensibly agree on the
governing legal framework. Moreover, these divides frequently map
the growing ideological and partisan divides on the Court: The 2018
Term found Justice Kagan often leading the liberal Democraticappointed Justices in defending established administrative law,
while Justice Gorsuch was often at the forefront of the conservative
Republican-appointed Justices in attacking existing doctrine and
Chief Justice Roberts stood squarely in the middle.172 Given that administrative law cases frequently carry high political stakes, such a
stark ideological and partisan divide should be particularly troubling
for those worried about the Court being seen as a politicized actor.173
The Justices’ ﬂipped stances on deference between these two cases
reinforce that politicized appearance.
Drill further down, and several analytic tensions become apparent.
These are familiar analytic divides from public law more broadly, but
their appearance in the administrative law context is more recent.
These tensions—between formalism and anti-formalism, originalism
and more general historicism, textualism and common law development—provide the intellectual underpinnings for today’s battles
over administrative law. Yet it is hard to see these divisions as driving

171
Justice Alito did not join Gorsuch’s opinion in Gundy, and Justice Kavanaugh did not
participate in the case.
172
On the growing ideological and partisan divide, see generally Neal Devins and Lawrence Baum, Split Deﬁnitive: How Party Polarization Turned the Supreme Court into a Partisan
Court, 2016 Supreme Court Review 301 (2016).
173
See Claire Brockway and Bradley Jones, Partisan Gap Widens in Views of the Supreme Court,
Pew Research Center (Aug 7, 2019) (“[T]hree-quarters of Republicans and Republican-leaning
independents have a favorable opinion of the Supreme Court, compared with only about half
(49%) of Democrats and Democratic leaners.”).
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Roberts Court administrative law. In particular, these analytic tensions do not consistently map onto the Justices’ line-ups in administrative law cases or the ideological divisions on the Court.
a. formalism and nonformalism
The ﬁrst clearly evident conceptual divide centers on formalism.
One group of Justices is deeply formalist in approach across a range
of administrative law issues, while another is resolutely nonformalist.
Nonformalism on the Roberts Court is hard to deﬁne speciﬁcally; it
encompasses a range of approaches from legal realism, to pragmatism, functionalism, and minimalism. The 2018 Term decisions suggest that while formalism has a greater presence on the Court now
than for many decades, it has yet to secure a committed majority.
1. Legal realism versus legal formalism. Underlying current disputes
over deference to administrative determinations lies a fundamental
disagreement on the nature of legal interpretation and the relationship of law and policy.174 This is clearest in Kisor. There, Justice
Gorsuch portrayed law as ﬁxed, determinate, and categorically distinct from policy.175 This categorical distinction between law and
policy, and correspondingly between legal interpretation and policy
choice, was essential for his argument that deference to agency regulatory interpretations violates Article III. That argument hinged on
the Marbury claim that “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of
the judicial department to say what the law is,”176 along with an insistence that courts must exercise independent judgment in order to
adequately perform this law-declaring function.177 But if regulatory
interpretation constitutes policy choice to a signiﬁcant degree, such
interpretation appears less the type of law-declaring activity that on

174
See Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Neoclassical Administrative Law, 133 Harv L Rev 852, 861–84
(2020).
175
176

See text accompanying note 73.
Marbury v Madison, 5 US (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).

177
Kisor, 139 S Ct at 2437–38 (Kagan, J) (plurality). Whether declaring the law necessarily
entails exercising independent judgment is much disputed. Justice Kagan argued in Kisor that
judges also can declare the meaning of law by determining that the law assigns primary interpretive responsibility to another institution of government. But the Court has come to
read Marbury as standing for a requirement of independent judgment and judicial supremacy
in constitutional interpretation. See Cooper v Aaron, 358 US 1, 18 (1958); Henry P. Monaghan,
Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 Colum L Rev 1, 9–10 (1983).
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Gorsuch’s account is constitutionally assigned to the courts’ independent purview and into which the political branches may not intrude.178
Justice Kagan’s statement in Kisor that “sometimes . . . law runs
out,” leaving “policy-laden choice,”179 might at ﬁrst suggest a similar
view of law and policy as distinct entities. But her argument was actually the opposite. Her insistence that regulatory ambiguity is inevitable, and that law is incomplete and cannot resolve all legal disputes, painted law and legal interpretation as intrinsically linked to
policy choice. And she moved from arguing that legal interpretation
in the context of regulatory ambiguity involves policy choice to the
claim that in many instances Congress would likely want that policy
choice to rest in the hands of an expert, experienced agency. From
there, Auer deference followed.
The classical image of law as ﬁxed, determinate, and categorically
distinct from policy is highly formalist, whereas the view of law as
indeterminate and inevitably entailing policy choice typiﬁes legal
realism.180 The terms of this debate are thus familiar, but its surfacing
today is more surprising. The legal realist view of law has dominated
administrative law ever since the cementing of the administrative
state in the 1940s.181 Adrian Vermeule has described the ensuing years
as a time of law’s ever-growing abnegation, with law pushed to the
margins as more and more decisions appeared in a policy guise better
ﬁt for agencies than courts.182 Even when formalism made a comeback in related public law ﬁelds, as occurred with the advent of textualism in statutory interpretation in the 1980s,183 ordinary administrative law retained its realist orientation. After all, it was in 1984 that
178
Not surprisingly, therefore, Justice Thomas has articulated a similarly ﬁrm divide between law and policy in his opinions arguing that deference to agency statutory and regulatory interpretations is unconstitutional. See Michigan v EPA, 135 S Ct 2699, 2712 (2015)
(Thomas, J, concurring).
179

Kisor, 139 S Ct at 2415 (Kagan, J) (plurality).
See Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 Yale L J 509, 510–15 (1988); see also Frederick
Schauer, Legal Realism Untamed, 91 Tex L Rev 749, 754–56 (2013); see also Brian Z.
Tamanaha, Understanding Legal Realism, 87 Tex L Rev 731, 732 (2009).
181
See Cass R. Sunstein, Essay, Beyond Marbury: The Executive’s Power to Say What the Law
Is, 115 Yale L J 2580, 2593–95, 2598 (2006); see also Richard Pildes, Institutional Formalism
and Realism in Constitutional and Public Law, 2013 Supreme Court Review 1, 21–30 (describing
movement between institutional realism and institutional formalism in administrative law);
Pojanowski, 133 Harv L Rev at 857 (cited in note 174) (noting “the working, moderate legal
realism that characterizes much mainstream administrative law”).
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Vermeule, Law’s Abnegation at 10 (cited in note 155).
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William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Texualism, 37 UCLA L Rev 621, 646–47 (1989).
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the Chevron Court justiﬁed deference to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous statutory provisions, arguing that in those
contexts interpretation entails a policy choice implicitly delegated to
the agency.184
In its current incarnation in Roberts Court administrative law,
legal realism surfaces in a domesticated legal process guise.185 Law is
not portrayed as entirely or necessarily indeterminate; even realistinclined Justices often conclude that agency statutory interpretations
fail Chevron and are not deserving of deference.186 Moreover, Justice
Kagan’s arguments for deference in Kisor echo legal process’s focus
on a rational Congress and the institutional capacities of courts and
agencies. Critically, moreover, Kagan ties deference not to abstract
institutional features, but instead to judicial determinations of whether
particular decisions reﬂect agencies’ comparative institutional advantages.187 Richard Pildes has used the term “institutional realism” to
capture this sensitivity to “how these institutions actually function in,
and over, time.”188 Justice Breyer’s opinion in Department of Commerce
is to the same effect: Deference turns on whether a speciﬁc agency
decision shows expertise and informed, thorough consideration; it does
not follow automatically from the fact that the decision represents a
policy question or was made by a politically accountable actor.189
By contrast, legal formalism in Roberts Court administrative law
takes a categorical approach to policy questions as well as legal questions. Two distinct formalist approaches to policy are evident in
this Term’s decisions. On the one hand, there is Justice Gorsuch’s
separation-of-powers formalism in Gundy, which classiﬁes broad
policy determinations as categorically legislative and constitutionally
excluded from agencies’ ambit. On the other, there is Justice Thomas’s
184

Chevron v National Resources Defense Council, 467 US 837, 843–45, 865–86 (1984).

185

See William N. Eskridge, Jr. and Philip P. Frickey, The Making of the Legal Process, 107
Harv L Rev 2031, 2042–45 (1994) (arguing that legal process was a synthesis of legal realism
and other pre–World War II intellectual traditions, and describing legal process’s core intellectual commitments as “the reasoned elaboration of purposive law,” “law as an institutional system,” and “the centrality of process”) (capitalization omitted).
186
See, for example, Sturgeon v Frost, 139 S Ct 1066, 1080 n 3 (2019) (Kagan, J) (“Because
we see . . . no ambiguity as to Section 103(c)’s meaning, we cannot give deference to the Park
Service’s contrary construction” under Chevron).
187
Kisor, 139 S Ct at 2416 (Kagan, J) (plurality).
188
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Pildes, 2013 Supreme Court Review at 2 (cited in note 181).

Department of Commerce, 139 S Ct at 2595 (Breyer, J, concurring in part and dissenting
in part).

1]

ROBERTS COURT AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

43

effort in Department of Commerce to preserve an arena for administrative policy judgments largely immune from judicial review, at the
same time as he would banish policy from the world of law. Justice
Kavanaugh signaled a similar effort in Kisor when he urged courts to
“engage in appropriately rigorous scrutiny of an agency’s interpretation of a regulation, and . . . simultaneously be appropriately deferential to an agency’s reasonable policy choices within the discretion
allowed by a regulation.”190 Jeffrey Pojanowski has offered a sustained
analytic defense of such a conjoined approach, which he terms neoclassical administrative law. The aim is precisely “to sharpen the line
between law and policy in administrative law, with the consequence
of increasing judicial responsibility on questions of law while decreasing it on matters [of] policymaking discretion.”191
At ﬁrst glance, a neoclassical approach might seem to offer a happy
compromise of formalism and realism, respecting constitutional lines
and also comparative institutional strengths. But combining legal
formalism and policy deference in this fashion is unlikely to succeed.
Any sharp demarcation between questions of law and questions of
policy is implausible—as a practical as well as a conceptual matter. In
an increasingly statutory and regulatory world such as ours, policy
choices rarely surface in law-free zones. The choices judges will make
in construing law will inevitably signiﬁcantly curtail the space left
for policy. Although Kavanaugh argued that “open-ended terms like
‘reasonable,’ ‘appropriate,’ ‘feasible’ or ‘practicable’ . . . afford agencies broad policy discretion,”192 courts accustomed to deﬁnitively
resolving interpretive ambiguity on their own may ﬁnd these terms
to have deﬁnite legal content as well.193 Moreover, the arguments
for deference to agencies on fact and policy matters—such as agencies’

190
Kisor, 139 S Ct at 2449 (Kavanaugh, J, concurring in the judgment). See also Brett M.
Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 Harv L Rev 2118, 2153–54 (2016) (“This very
important principle sometimes gets lost: a judge can engage in appropriately rigorous scrutiny of an agency’s statutory interpretation and simultaneously be very deferential to an
agency’s policy choices within the discretion granted to it by the statute.”).
191
Pojanowski, 133 Harv L Rev at 884 (cited in note 174).
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Kisor, 139 S Ct at 2448 (Kavanaugh, J, concurring in the judgment).

See, for example, Michigan, 135 S Ct at 2707–08 (reading “appropriate” in provision of
the Clean Air Act as requiring EPA to consider costs in making initial decision to regulate);
MetLife v Financial Stability Oversight Council, 177 F Supp 3d 219, 239–41 (DDC 2016) (statutory provision requiring agency to consider “any other risk-related factor” it deems “appropriate” required agency to consider costs to company of being subject to regulation).
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greater political accountability, expertise, or congressional authorization—also push toward deference in law application, which easily spills
over into law interpretation.194 As Vermeule has put it, “[l]ogically,
there [is] no necessary contradiction” between courts according deference to agencies on ordinary fact questions and exercising independent judgment on questions of law, but “the deep premises and
attitude of each [a]re inconsistent with the deep premises and attitude
of the other.”195 In like vein, Kristin Hickman and Nicholas Bednar
contend that recognition of the institutional beneﬁts of agency policymaking make something akin to Chevron deference inevitable.196 Even
on a more theoretical plane, legal formalism and broad policy deference
to agencies do not easily combine. Legal formalism goes hand in hand
with a broader separation-of-powers formalism that, as noted, views
agency policy determinations as executive branch usurpation of the
legislative power.
2. Formalism, functionalism, and remedial minimalism in separationof-powers analysis. Although legal determinacy formalism was largely
absent on the Court until recently, formalism has had a steady presence in separation-of-powers analysis. separation-of-powers formalism evinces the same commitment to categorical lines, with the relevant lines here being constitutional distinctions among legislative,
executive, and judicial power, each of which is viewed as formally
vested in one branch of government with intermixing limited to those
instances expressly sanctioned in the Constitution. By contrast, a more
functionalist analysis views powers as overlapping, emphasizes the
overall balance among the branches, and focuses on the beneﬁts of a
particular governmental structure and that structure’s impact on a
branch’s abilityto perform its core functions.197 As many commentators
have argued, formalism and functionalism should not be viewed as
opposed approaches in the separation-of-powers context; most decisions have elements of both orientations, and both approaches share
194
Cass Sunstein argues that pre-Chevron decisions granting deference to agency statutory
interpretations represented such law application. Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron as Law, 107
Georgetown L J 1613, 1649 (2019); see, for example, NLRB v Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 US
111, 130 (1944); Gray v Powell, 314 US 402, 412 (1941).
195
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Nicholas R. Bednar and Kristin Hickman, Chevron’s Inevitability, 85 Geo Wash L Rev
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key elements, such as a concern about aggrandized power.198 Yet still,
they represent discrete stances between which the Court alternates in
its separation-of-powers jurisprudence.
These formalist and functionalist orientations were clearly on display this Term. Justice Gorsuch’s opinions in Gundy and Kisor were
paradigms of formalist separation-of-powers analysis, arguing that
the Constitution’s text draws clear lines between the distinct categories of executive, legislative, and judicial power.199 Yet he ultimately
justiﬁed strict enforcement of the Constitution’s distribution of
powers in teleological terms, in particular as essential to protecting
individual liberty and guarding against “arbitrary use of governmental
power.”200 Kagan barely engaged Gorsuch’s lengthy constitutional
attack on Auer, but her dismissive response was largely functionalist,
noting that the Court had long upheld mixing of executive and judicial
functions in agencies and emphasizing that judges were able to check
agency regulation interpretations under Auer.201 Functionalism also
dominated Kagan’s constitutional defense of delegation in Gundy,
where she offered a vision of separation of powers that stressed ﬂexibility, practicality, and effectiveness before reframing the case as being
about statutory interpretation rather than constitutional structure.202
And Chief Justice Roberts elevated realism over formalism in Department of Commerce, when he insisted that the Court was not naive
and would not fall for Ross’s contrived VRA justiﬁcation.203
Although in the 2018 Term formalist arguments fell short, at other
times the Roberts Court has taken a formalist approach to separation of powers and constitutional structural analysis generally.204
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See Magill, 150 U Pa L Rev at 609–11 (cited in note 197); see also Manning, 124 Harv
L Rev at 1971–73 (cited in note 197) (arguing that both represent free-ﬂoating and purposivist forms of separation-of-powers analysis). For a critique of the formalism-functionalism
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rules and standards, see Aziz Z. Huq and Jon D. Michaels, The Cycles in Separation-of-Powers
Jurisprudence, 126 Yale L J 346, 354–56 (2016).
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Examples include two leading opinions written by Chief Justice Roberts: Free Enterprise Fund, which imposed a categorical prohibition on double-for-cause removal protection; and Stern v Marshall,
which drew a bright-line distinction between public and private
rights for purposes of determining when adjudication outside of the
Article III courts is constitutional.205 Yet there have also been notable
instances when the Court has taken a more functionalist stance. In
NLRB v Noel Canning, the Court took a pragmatic approach to interpreting the scope of the Recess Appointments Clause, justifying its
reading as necessary to serve the clause’s purpose and supported by
long-standing practice.206 And in Wellness International Network v
Sharif, the Court held that consent of the parties can make some forms
of non-Article III adjudication constitutional, insisting that analysis
of this “question must be decided not by ‘formalistic and unbending
rules,’ but ‘with an eye to the practical effect that the’ practice ‘will
have on the constitutionally assigned role of the federal judiciary.’”207
Even the Court’s more formalist decisions can have a heavy functionalist component; a key driver of Free Enterprise, for example, is
“the Court’s own functional assessment of how much accountability
executive ofﬁcers properly owe to the President.”208
As important, even the Roberts Court’s formalistic separation-ofpowers decisions are often cabined in ways that suggest concern with
minimizing their practical impact. Free Enterprise Fund and Stern are
again good examples of this phenomenon. In Free Enterprise, Roberts’s majority opinion took a minimalist approach to remedying its
ﬁnding that double-for-cause removal protection for members of the
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board was unconstitutional,

205
Free Enterprise Fund, 561 US at 492; Stern v Marshall, 564 US 462, 483–84 (2011).
Although the Court’s formalism often leads to invalidation of the challenged measure, that
result is not universal. Recently, in Oil States Energy Services, LLC v Greene’s Energy Group,
LLC, the Court adhered to a formalist distinction between private and public rights, yet
nonetheless upheld the non–Article III method of administrative adjudication at issue. 138 S
Ct at 1365, 1373 (2018). And on occasion a more functionalist analysis leads to invalidation,
as in Lucia v SEC, when the Court focused on the speciﬁc functions and responsibilities of
administrative law judges at the SEC in concluding that they were inferior ofﬁcers. 138 S Ct
at 2044, 2052–54 (2018).
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573 US at 513, 532, 540–43 (2014).
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signaling in the process that it was not calling single-for-cause protection into question. Insisting that the unconstitutional double-forcause provision could be severed while leaving the Board otherwise
intact, the Court rejected greater “blue-pencil[ing]” of SarbanesOxley Act provisions as a job “belong[ing] to the Legislature, not the
Judiciary.”209 In a similar vein, Roberts’s majority opinion in Stern not
only suggested a carve-out for administrative adjudication, but also
retained a broad deﬁnition of public right and reafﬁrmed precedents
that sanctioned a broad role for non-Article III adjudication.210 The
question of whether to continue with this minimalist approach to
remedying separation-of-powers violations is now before the Court,
with the Justices adding a question on severability to their consideration of the constitutionality of the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau’s single-director structure.211
Such remedial minimalism might seem at ﬁrst to be functionalist,
insofar as it tailors constitutional remedies to limit disruption and
preserve as much of Congress’s work as possible. Formalist separationof-powers decisions are famous for casting aside analogous concerns of
convenience, efﬁciency, and utility in service of upholding separationof-power principles.212 On the other hand, rejection of greater remedial creativity as outside of the judicial role sounds in a formalist register.
More signiﬁcantly, remedial minimalism is likely critical for the success
of separation-of-powers formalism in practice. Otherwise, adoption of
separation-of-powers formalism might well entail substantial transformation in the national administrative state, as Justice Gorsuch suggested in his Kisor and Gundy opinions—a result that might make a
majority of the Court less willing to sustain formalist arguments. From
this perspective, remedial minimalism appears primarily as a strategic
device, one that makes separation-of-powers formalism more palatable,
even if analytically more aligned with functionalism.
∗ ∗ ∗

209

Free Enterprise Fund, 561 US at 495–96, 509–10.

210

Stern, 564 US at 488–93.

211

See Seila Law LLC v Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, No 19-7, 2019 WL 5281290,
at ∗1 (US Oct 18, 2019) (directing the parties to address whether “[i]f the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau is found unconstitutional on the basis of the separation of powers, can 12
USC § 5491(c)(3) be severed from the Dodd-Frank Act?”).
212

See INS v Chadha, 462 US 919, 944 (1983).

48

THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW

[2019

In short, the Roberts Court is simultaneously formalist and nonformalist in its approach to administrative law. Greater coherence
exists within the two ideological camps, with conservatives often
taking a more formalist view and the liberals being more nonformalist and speciﬁcally functionalist in orientation. Even here, however,
there are noteworthy inconsistencies. Several conservative Justices
have signed onto opinions stating that deference to agency legal interpretations can be constitutional,213 as well as taken a minimalist or
even functionalist approach to separation of powers.214 And the same
is true of the Roberts Court liberals, who at times have been willing to
pull back on deference or adopt formalist approaches to separation
of powers.215 These inconsistencies in part reﬂect the fact that antiadministrativist views have been gradually emerging, as well as strategic defensive compromises. But the overall effect is to suggest a
court deciding cases on a somewhat ad hoc basis.
b. originalism and historicism
A second prominent feature of many Roberts Court administrative
law opinions is their focus on the past. To some extent, this is simply a
manifestation of originalism’s increased role in Roberts Court constitutional analysis, combined with the heavy constitutional ﬂavor of
attacks on established administrative law.216 The historical lens often
extends beyond the Founding, however, to include consideration of
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See, for example, Pereira, 138 S Ct at 2121 (Alito, J, dissenting) (criticizing the Court for
not adhering to Chevron); City of Arlington, 569 US at 317–18 (Alito and Kennedy, JJ, joining
dissent by Roberts, CJ, arguing that deference to agency legal interpretations is compatible
with courts’ law-declaring role if Congress has delegated such authority).
214
See text accompanying notes 209–12; Wellness Networks, 135 S Ct at 1949 (Alito, J,
concurring in the judgment in part); PHH Corp. v Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 839
F3d 1, 30–36 (2016) (Kavanaugh, J, dissenting from decision en banc) (making the functionalist argument that an agency headed by a single director with for-cause removal protection lacks the checks on abuse of power of multimember-headed independent agencies and
is unconstitutional).
215
See, for example, Kisor, 139 S Ct at 2414–18 (Kagan, J) (plurality) (limiting Auer deference); Oil States, 138 S Ct at 1379–80 (Breyer, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor, JJ, concurring in
opinion upholding administrative adjudication on purely originalist public rights grounds;
Kagan, J, concurred without separate opinion); Noel Canning, 573 US at 550 (adopting
bright-line rule that “the Senate is in session when it says it is, provided that, under its own
rules, it retains the capacity to transact Senate business”).
216
See Larry Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon 019: Originalism, Legal Theory Blog (as revised
on Aug 11, 2019), at https://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2004/01/legal_theory
_le_1.html (originalism on Roberts Court).
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judicial precedent and sometimes governmental practice over the nineteenth century. This wider scope reﬂects broader trends in constitutional interpretation and originalist scholarship, in particular emphasis on political branch practices as constructing constitutional
meaning or liquidating constitutional meaning over time.217 As Sophia
Lee has suggested, this wider historical orientation also reﬂects antiadministrativists’ view of the nation’s ﬁrst century as a period of limited
administrative government and judicial ascendancy in enforcing the
law.218
In prior Terms, Justice Thomas has most consistently and comprehensively developed the originalist attack on modern administrative law. In the 2018 Term, this role fell to Justice Gorsuch.
Originalism underlies Gorsuch’s formalist account of law and the
judicial power in Kisor, but especially dominates his Gundy dissent,
which opens with a lengthy discussion of the Framers’ views of constitutional structure, legislative power, and their fear of excessive lawmaking.219 Gorsuch also takes a wider historical lens, however. In
Kisor, he examined the Court’s precedents on deference over the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to show that Auer was a historical aberration.220 Similarly, in Gundy he reviewed the Court’s delegation jurisprudence over time to show that, even if the Court upheld
delegations, it nonetheless adhered to his account of the narrow
bounds of constitutional delegation until the 1940s. Indeed, in both
opinions Gorsuch portrays the post-New Deal era of the 1940s as a
period of sharp break from long-standing traditions.221
No doubt, Justice Gorsuch’s engagement with nineteenth- and
early twentieth-century jurisprudence is in part a strategic effort to
rebut what on the surface appear to be strong stare decisis arguments
for retaining current administrative law doctrines. Yet this engage217
For discussion of these trends in originalist thinking, see Lawrence B. Solum, The
Fixation Thesis: The Role of Historical Fact in Original Meaning, 91 Notre Dame L Rev 1, 3–16
(2015). For discussion of constitutional liquidation and its relationship to interpretive
approaches that emphasize historical practice, see Willam Baude, Constitutional Liquidation,
71 Stan L Rev 1 (2019), and Curtis A. Bradley and Neil S. Seigel, Historical Gloss, Madisonian
Liquidation, and the Originalism Debate, Va L Rev (forthcoming 2020), at https://papers.ssrn
.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_idp3331588.
218
Sophia Z. Lee, Our Administered Constitution: Administrative Constitutionalism from the
Founding to the Present, 168 U Pa L Rev 1699, 1702–03 (2019).
219
Gundy, 139 S Ct at 2133–36 (Gorsuch, J, dissenting).
220
221

Kisor, 139 S Ct at 2426–30 (Gorsuch, J, concurring in the judgment).

Gundy, 139 S Ct at 2137–39 (Gorsuch, J, dissenting); Kisor, 139 S Ct at 2426–29
(Gorsuch, J, concurring in the judgment).
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ment is also evidence of the limited sway originalism actually has in
Roberts Court opinions attacking the administrative state. Indeed,
despite its frequent invocation, originalism often has a superﬁcial cast
in these opinions, surfacing primarily in claims that administrative
government is at odds with the general separation-of-powers principles and concerns of the Framers, rather than in evidence of originalist
rejection of speciﬁc practices.222 A prime example is Gorsuch’s opinion
in Gundy, which based its nondelegation arguments on abstract accounts of the Framers’ views of constitutional structure and legislative
power, rather than focusing on actual delegations from the period.223
Interestingly, the historical lens is not limited to administrative
law’s opponents. Administrative law’s judicial defenders often adopt
a historicist stance as well. To be sure, they give more weight to recent history than their anti-administrative colleagues, but recent history for these purposes often stretches back eighty to ninety years.
Thus, in Kisor and Gundy Justice Kagan emphasized lines of precedents dating back to the 1940s and before that upheld deference to
agencies’ regulatory interpretations and broad delegations.224 Perhaps the starkest historicist defense of established administrative arrangements came in Justice Breyer’s 2014 majority opinion in NLRB v
Noel Canning. In that case, Breyer drew on political branch practices
going back to the Founding as well as the post–World War II period
to hold that the recess appointment power could be used during an
intrasession recess and with respect to vacancies that existed before
the recess commenced.225 Moreover, Breyer expressly justiﬁed historical practice as particularly important in separation-of-powers challenges, a marked contrast to his view four years earlier in Free Enterprise
Fund that historical practices at the time of the Founding did not offer
“signiﬁcant help” in assessing a separation-of-powers challenge to removal protections.226
222
See Metzger, 131 Harv L Rev at 45–46 (cited in note 11). An exception is Oil States, where
both Justice Thomas’s majority opinion and Justice Gorsuch’s dissent discussed original
practices relating to the granting and rescinding of patents in detail. 138 S Ct at 1377; id at
1381–83 (Gorsuch, J, dissenting).
223
Gundy, 139 S Ct at 2133–37; Julian Davis Mortenson and Nicholas Bagley, Delegation
at the Founding ∗20–21 (unpublished manuscript, Dec 2019), at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstract_idp3512154.
224
Kisor, 139 S Ct at 2411–12 & nn 2–3 (Kagan, J) (plurality); Gundy, 139 S Ct at 2129–30
(Kagan, J) (plurality).
225

Noel Canning, 573 US at 524–26, 528–33, 543.
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Free Enterprise Fund, 561 US at 517.
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In short, Justices of all stripes are increasingly looking to past
practices and historical precedents in administrative law cases. Department of Commerce showcased this trend too. There, both Chief
Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas emphasized the long historical
practice of including a citizenship question on the census as far back
as 1782, with Roberts holding that this “early understanding . . . and
long practice” meant that asking about citizenship did not violate the
Enumeration Clause.227 Justice Breyer similarly relied on the history
of the census, but the historical account he offered put prime emphasis on transformations in how the census was conducted after
1950, in response to concerns about high undercounting rates.228
Historical battles also dominate recent administrative law scholarship. Prominent attacks on administrative government by Philip
Hamburger, Joseph Postell, and others argue that current national
administrative government marks a stark departure from expectations and practices at the Founding through the nineteenth century.229
Their accounts are disputed by historians offering numerous studies
of administrative governance dating back just as far.230 The extent of
judicial deference to administrative legal interpretations is an issue
of particular historical dispute. In an article cited by Justice Gorsuch
in Kisor, Aditya Bamzai contends that before the 1940s the Supreme
Court did not have a tradition of deferring to executive interpretations, as Justice Scalia among others had maintained. Instead, the
Court “‘respected’ longstanding and contemporaneous executive interpretations of law as part of a practice of deferring to longstanding
and contemporaneous interpretation generally.”231 Disagreeing with
Bamzai, Craig Green maintains that the Court’s jurisprudence is
more varied and supportive of deference to executive actors, identifying instances in which the Court suggested that “the construction

227

139 S Ct at 2567, 2577.

228

Id at 2585–87 (Breyer, J, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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See generally, for example, Philip Hamburger, Is Administrative Law Unlawful? (Chicago,
2014); Joseph Postell, Bureaucracy in America: The Administrative State’s Challenge to Constitutional Government (Missouri, 2017); see also Richard Epstein, The Dubious Morality of the Modern
Administrative State (Manhattan Institute, 2019).
230
See, for example, Brian Balough, A Government Out of Sight (Cambridge, 2009); Jerry
Mashaw, Creating the Administrative Constitution (Yale, 2012); William Novak, The Myth of the
“Weak” American State, 113 Am Hist Rev 752, 752–53 (2008).
231
Aditya Bamzai, The Origins of Judicial Deference to Executive Interpretation, 126 Yale L J
908, 916, 965 (2017).
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given to a statute by those charged with the duty of executing it is
always entitled to the most respectful consideration.”232 And Lee
argues that early administrative agencies “had the ﬁrst and often ﬁnal
word on the Constitution’s meaning” such that “reinstating the
19th century constitutional order . . . would all but eliminate judicial
review of [agency] actions’ constitutionality.”233
This historical scholarship holds important lessons for current debates over administrative law and the administrative state more broadly.
The extensive history of administrative agencies operating from the
nation’s beginnings to today undercuts efforts to paint contemporary administrative government as a fundamental deviation from the
Constitution. To be sure, the extent of administrative authority existing before the twentieth century is disputed. In addition, much of
the early national administrative state was developmental and distributional, with many administrative agencies operating in the territories or implementing administrative regimes that involved matters
of public right.234 Still, too many early examples exist of broad administrative discretion, coercive administrative actions targeting private
rights, and limited judicial review to justify accounts that portray administrative government and administrative law as twentieth-century
aberrations.235
Moreover, it is unclear why the public right focus and territorial
operation of early administrative regimes should limit their historical
signiﬁcance. Those were the primary contexts in which the national

232
United States v Moore, 95 US 760, 763 (1877); Craig Green, Deconstructing the Administrative State: Constitutional Debates over Chevron and Political Transformation in American Law
128–34 (Temple University Beasley School of Law Research Paper No 2018-35, Nov 2018),
at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_idp3264482.
233
Lee, 168 U Pa L Rev at 1707 (cited in note 218).
234
Samuel DeCanio, Democracy and the Origins of the American Regulatory State 21–22 (Yale,
2015); see also Hamburger, Is Administrative Law Unlawful? at 193–203 (cited in note 229)
(early administration involved beneﬁts and privileges); Aditya Bamzai, Delegation and Interpretive Discretion: Gundy, Kisor, and the Formation and Future of Administrative Law, 133 Harv
L Rev 164, 177–82 (2019) (distinguishing early precedent sustaining broad delegations as
relating to public rights).
235
Some examples from Jerry Mashaw include the 1807–09 embargo, operation of the
Land Ofﬁce, and steamship regulation in the 1850s. Mashaw, Creating at 91–143, 192–208,
216–18 (cited in note 230). Ann Woolhandler maintains that the “[u]sing the right /privilege
theory to explain older patterns in judicial review is problematic,” noting that “the Court
sometimes reviewed government exactions affecting private rights under the deferential res
judicata model. At other times, the Court accorded rigorous judicial review in cases seeking
remedies for denials of government beneﬁts or largesse.” Judicial Deference to Administrative
Action, 43 Admin L Rev 197, 231–34 (1991).
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government of the time was active, and its actions had tremendous
importance for the individuals affected.236 Although some administrative skeptics view this history as suggesting that administrative
power to regulate and adjudicate private rights is limited,237 an alternative lesson to draw is that the national government has always
relied on agencies when it decides to act. And it is possible to understand many forms of contemporary regulation, particularly those involving permits and licenses or that create statutory rights and obligations, as modern-day versions of public rights—indeed, for many
decades the Supreme Court has taken just such an approach.238 Thus,
even if this history is viewed as limited to public rights, it would still
carry substantial relevance in establishing the historical legitimacy of
administrative governance.
Hence, originalism and historicism may turn out to be powerful
tools in administrative government’s defense. At the same time,
framing the defense of administrative law and administrative government in historical terms has the downside of suggesting that the
acceptable bounds and forms of administrative action are set by what
has been done before. This leads to novelty and innovation being
viewed as indications that an administrative arrangement is constitutionally suspect, a position advanced in several Roberts Court opinions.239 But as the D.C. Circuit recently stated, such a view is at odds
with the Court’s separation-of-powers jurisprudence, which has often
sustained measures that were novel in their day.240 Nor is such a
236
For a discussion of the importance of the territories to contemporary debates over
administrative law and to the lives of many Americans in the nation’s early years, see Gregory
Ablavsky, Administrative Constitutionalism in the Northwest Territory, 167 U Pa L Rev 1631,
1633–36 (2019).
237
See, for example, Hamburger, Is Administrative Law Unlawful? at 198–202 (cited in note
229) (acknowledging the historical administrative adjudication of patent rights but distinguishing them from other private rights); Gary Lawson, Appointments and Illegal Adjudication: The
America Invents Act Through a Constitutional Lens, 2018 Geo Mason L Rev 26, 38–50 (describing
nineteenth-century cases rejecting the administrative adjudication of land patents and contrasting them with “case law from the past eight decades systematically upholding administrative
actions that adjudicate private vested rights”).
238
See Stern, 564 US at 490 (noting “the Court rejected the limitation of the public rights
exception to actions involving the Government as a party” but has “limit[ed] the exception to
cases in which the claim at issue derives from a federal regulatory scheme, or in which resolution of the claim by an expert Government agency is deemed essential to a limited regulatory objective within the agency’s authority”).
239
240

Leah M. Litman, Debunking Antinovelty, 66 Duke L J 1407, 1415–21 (2017).

PHH Corp. v Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 881 F3d 75, 102–03 (DC Cir 2018)
(en banc) (noting that the independent counsel, the FTC, and the Sentencing Commission all
represented new arrangements but where upheld as constitutional).
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constraint easily squared with the Constitution’s text, which gives
Congress broad power to structure government as it sees ﬁt.241
A historical lens can also stand in tension with efforts to rethink
constitutional and administrative law to better ﬁt current realities.242
This tension is particularly acute when the historical lens is an
originalist one, as the worlds of 1789 and 2020 are far apart when it
comes to the shape and responsibilities of national government. But
even a more limited backward-looking gaze may ill ﬁt efforts to address the governance crises of today. Two of the most salient characteristics of contemporary national government are the deep political
polarization that has stymied congressional action on pressing issues
and increasingly bold assertions of presidential power that undercut
established administrative practices and legal regimes.243 Although both
have surfaced in earlier eras, their combination and intensity today
create governance challenges that did not exist even a generation ago,
and their resolution may necessitate experimenting with structural
arrangements at odds with traditional governmental models.
c. apa textualism, apa originalism, and administrative
common law
A third analytic contrast in Roberts Court administrative law concerns the different stances the Justices take toward the APA and other
administrative law statutes. The Roberts Court is often described as
textualist in its approach to statutory interpretation, including by the
Justices themselves.244 Whether this is a wholly accurate description
is a matter of debate; the Court has deviated from textualism in several prominent statutory interpretation cases.245 In the administrative
241

See Manning, 128 Harv L Rev at 5–7 (cited in note 208).

242

For an effort to rethink administrative government’s constitutionality along these lines,
emphasizing the constitutional implications of the broad delegations that characterize contemporary government, see Metzger, 131 Harv L Rev at 87–94 (cited in note 11).
243
Id at 75–76; Sarah Blinder, The Dysfunctional Congress, 18 Ann Rev Pol Sci 85, 91–97
(2015).
244
See Manning, 128 Harv L Rev at 22–29 (cited in note 208); Anton Metlisky, The Roberts
Court and the New Textualism, 38 Cardozo L Rev 671, 672 (2016). Justice Kagan famously
stated “we are all textualists now” during a lecture she gave at Harvard Law School. Justice
Elena Kagan, The Scalia Lecture: A Dialogue with Justice Kagan on the Reading of Statutes 8:29
(Harvard Law School, Nov 18, 2015), at http://today.law.harvard.edu/in-scalia-lecture-kagan
-discusses-statutory-interpretation.
245
Compare Metlisky, 38 Cardozo L Rev at 672–74 (cited in note 244), with Abbe R. Gluck,
Imperfect Statutes, Imperfect Courts: Understanding Congress’s Plan in the Era of Unorthodox
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law context, at least, the Roberts Court has equivocated between
textualist and common law approaches to major administrative law
statutes.
Textualism was supreme in Perez v Mortgage Bankers Association in
2015.246 Although the APA expressly exempts interpretive rules from
notice-and-comment rulemaking requirements, D.C. Circuit doctrine had held that once an agency issued a deﬁnitive interpretation of
a regulation, the agency had to use notice-and-comment rulemaking
to change that interpretation.247 As noted above, the Roberts Court
unanimously reversed, with the majority opinion emphasizing that
the D.C. Circuit’s approach was “contrary to the clear text of the
APA’s rulemaking provisions.”248 Textualism also dominated the
Court’s approach to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) in Food
Marketing Institute v Argus Leader, a 2018 Term decision rejecting a
widely followed lower court interpretation of FOIA’s Exemption 4 as
protecting conﬁdential information from disclosure only when disclosure would cause competitive harm. That interpretation, according to Justice Gorsuch’s majority opinion for a 6–3 Court, ignored
that “[i]n statutory interpretation disputes, a court’s proper starting
point lies in a careful examination of the ordinary meaning and structure of the law itself. Where . . . that examination yields a clear answer,
judges must stop.”249
Text also featured in Kisor, with Justice Kagan and Justice Gorsuch
battling over the meaning of § 706. This battle took an originalist
cast, focusing on what the APA’s text was understood to mean when
originally adopted. Gorsuch drew on the APA’s legislative history
and contemporaneous scholarly accounts to argue that the APA was
originally understood to require de novo judicial review of legal questions, while Kagan countered with evidence that the APA’s enactors
Lawmaking, 129 Harv L Rev 62, 80–96 (2015). For the interesting suggestion that the Court’s
turn to purposivism is linked to its move away from Chevron, see Note, The Rise of Purposivism
and the Fall of Chevron, 130 Harv L Rev 1227 (2017).
246

135 S Ct 1199 (2015).

247

See 5 USC § 553(b)(A); Paralyzed Veterans of America v DC Arena LP, 117 F3d 579, 586
(1997).
248
249

See text accompanying note 36; Perez, 135 S Ct at 1206.

139 S Ct 2356, 2364, 2366 (2019). In so holding, the Court echoed an earlier Roberts
Court decision interpreting FOIA’s Exemption 2, where Justice Kagan’s majority opinion
denied that its interpretation was at odds with long-standing lower-court doctrine, but added
that even if it were in conﬂict, “we have no warrant to ignore clear statutory language on the
ground that other courts have done so.” Milner v Department of the Navy, 562 US 562, 569–
72, 576 (2011).
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had intended § 706 to restate the existing common law approach to
judicial review.250 Chief Justice Roberts’s narrow join left this debate
over the APA’s meaning in a 4–4 tie. Yet Kisor is fundamentally a
reafﬁrmation of administrative common law. Kagan’s reﬁnement of
Auer’s limits for a majority of the Court was the epitome of common
law doctrinal elaboration, and upholding the doctrine on stare decisis
gave ultimate priority to judicial precedent. For all his textualism with
respect to § 706, even Justice Gorsuch left room for some judicial
development of judicial review doctrine in his embrace of Skidmore
and his insistence that Auer violates § 553’s notice-and-comment requirements because of its practical effects, despite the section’s express
exception for interpretive rules.251
Common law development of judicial review doctrine was further
on display in Department of Commerce. Indeed, administrative common law was a constant baseline in the case, with all the Justices relying on State Farm despite that decision’s expansion of arbitrary and
capriciousness review beyond its original meaning.252 But administrative common law was even more prominent in Chief Justice Roberts’s elaboration of a prohibition on pretext for a majority of the
Court—a prohibition that, as mentioned above, was implicit in existing
case law but not expressly developed.253 Moreover, despite taking a
textual approach to statutory interpretation in other contexts, Roberts
never stopped to respond to Justice Thomas’s complaint that such a
pretext inquiry and adding extra-record materials had no basis in the
APA’s text.254 Instead, he simply invoked the Court’s precedents for
going beyond the record if a strong showing of bad faith is made and
the APA’s requirement of reasoned decision making.255
Viewing the 2018 Term opinions along with earlier precedent,
it becomes clear that the Justices’ views on textualist versus common

250
Kisor, 139 S Ct at 2419–20 (Kagan, J) (plurality); id at 2435–36 (Gorsuch, J, concurring
in the judgment).
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139 S Ct at 2434–35, 2442–43 (Gorsuch, J, concurring in the judgment).
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See Metzger, 80 Geo Wash L Rev at 1299–1300 (cited in note 96). But see Evan D.
Bernick, Envisioning Administrative Procedure Act Originalism, 70 Admin L Rev 807, 847–49
(2018) (arguing that hard-look review ﬁts within the “vague contours” of “arbitrary [and]
capricious” as originally understood in the APA).
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See text accompanying notes 147–48.
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See Department of Commerce, 139 S Ct at 2578–79 (Thomas, J, concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
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law interpretations of administrative law statutes do not track their
ideological divisions or overall stance on administrative government.
Instead, many individual Justices oscillate between administrative law
textualism and a more common law stance, as does the Court as a
whole.256 To some extent, this oscillation may reﬂect the speciﬁc
administrative law measures at issue. For example, FOIA’s text is far
more detailed and more recently amended than the APA, which helps
explain the contrast between Argus Leader, on the one hand, and Kisor
and Department of Commerce on the other, all decided in the 2018
Term. And the Court’s notably greater textualism in Perez than Kisor
and Department of Commerce may result from the fact that Perez involved the APA’s procedural requirements rather than its provisions
for judicial review. Not only are the APA’s procedural requirements
more detailed and speciﬁc than its judicial review provisions, but the
Court has allowed courts more leeway to develop the latter.257
Signiﬁcantly, however, such oscillation between APA textualism
and administrative common law is not a new phenomenon. For many
decades, the Court has periodically rejected administrative common
law as being at odds with the APA while simultaneously developing
new administrative common law doctrines. Despite this oscillation,
the common law approach to the APA has dominated, especially in
the area of judicial review.258 The paradigm example is Chevron, which
never referenced § 706’s text at all and justiﬁed its two-step approach
to deference on a combination of imputed congressional intent, precedent, pragmatic factors, and constitutional structure.259

256
There are exceptions. Justice Breyer fairly consistently adopts a common law approach.
See Argus Leader, 139 S Ct at 2368–69 (Breyer, J, concurring in part and dissenting in part);
Milner, 562 US at 585–90 (Breyer, J, dissenting), and Justices Thomas and Gorsuch have
been more consistently textualist (see, for example, text accompanying note 254); Gutierrez–
Brizuela v Lynch, 834 F3d 1142, 1151 (10th Cir 2016) (Gorsuch, J, concurring).
257
Compare Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v Natural Resources Defense Council, 435
US 519, 524, 542–49 (1978) (insisting that “[a]gencies are free to grant additional procedural
rights [beyond those in the APA] . . . but reviewing courts are generally not free to impose
them”), with Chevron, 467 US at 842–43 (setting out a two-step standard for judicial review of
agency statutory interpretations without referencing the APA).
258
See Metzger, 80 Geo Wash L Rev at 1298–1310 (cited in note 96). At the same time,
courts are “reluctant to be open about their use of common law in the administrative law
arena.” Jack M. Beermann, Common Law and Statute Law in Administrative Law, 63 Admin L
Rev 1, 2–3 (2011).
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John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 Tex L Rev 113, 189–93
(1999).
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A growing number of scholars now argue for APA originalism and
critique the common law approach to the APA.260 The arguments
against administrative common law range from defenses of textualist
statutory interpretation writ large to attacks on the legitimacy of
judicial lawmaking to concerns about the harmful effects of speciﬁc
common-law-developed doctrines.261 Notably, these critiques are offered by scholars with a range of views about judicial deference to
agencies and administrative government more broadly. In particular, prominent defenders of the administrative state have advocated
that courts should follow the APA’s original meaning and text.262
Critiques of administrative common law also are not limited to the
APA; John Brinkerhoff has defended the Roberts Court’s recent
FOIA textualism on the grounds that lower courts’ common law interpretations of FOIA wrongly downplayed FOIA’s pro-disclosure
orientation and instead imposed a “strong pro-government gloss over
nearly all of FOIA.”263
This growing scholarship underscores the potential pitfalls of administrative common law. But as I have argued elsewhere, it is important to separate out the merits and demerits of particular common
law doctrines from the general enterprise of administrative common
law.264 I am skeptical of efforts to broadly replace administrative common law with a textual and originalist approach to the APA. The APA’s
text often supports alternative readings, as made clear by the dueling
accounts of § 706 in Kisor and the strong and weak forms of arbitrary
and capriciousness review in Department of Commerce. Moreover, the
original meaning of the APA was and remains contested.265 George
260
See, for example, Bernick, 70 Admin L Rev at 809 & n 11 (cited in note 252) (providing
examples). John Duffy started this trend, writing the ﬁrst sustained attack on common law
approaches to judicial review under the APA twenty years ago. See Duffy, 77 Tex L Rev at
120 (cited in note 259).
261
See, for example, Nicholas Bagley, The Puzzling Presumption of Reviewability, 127 Harv L
Rev 1285, 1287–89, 1303–09 (2014) (arguing that the APA’s text does not support the presumption of reviewability that the Court has identiﬁed and that the presumption illegitimately
intrudes on congressional policy choices); Kathryn E. Kovacs, Superstatute Theory and Administrative Common Law, 90 Ind L J 1207, 1254–60 (2015) (applying superstatute theory to the APA
and critiquing administrative common law on public deliberation grounds).
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See Sunstein, 107 Georgetown L J at 1642–57 (cited in note 194); see also Bagley, 127
Harv L Rev at 1287–89, 1303–09 (cited in note 261) (arguing that APA textualism and
originalism lead to greater agency freedom from intrusive judicial review).
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Shepherd has described “the ﬁght over the APA” as “a pitched political battle for the life of the New Deal.” This battle meant that
key provisions of the APA were left intentionally ambiguous so that
agreement on the APA could be reached. And it meant that the APA’s
legislative history was intentionally manipulated by both sides to
advance their cause, leaving contradictory sources for future interpreters.266 One clear data point, however, is that the Supreme Court
never viewed the APA as overturning administrative common law or
its judicial review precedents, other than imposing a more searching
version of substantial evidence review.267
As important, administrative common law is an inevitable and legitimate phenomenon in our constitutional separation-of-powers system.268 It is inevitable given the difﬁculties Congress faces in legislating
and the practical impossibility of specifying answers to newly emergent
administrative law issues in advance. The result is that courts end up
tasked with policing agency actions under statutory constraints that
increasingly are out of step with administrative realities. Of course,
courts could leave the necessary updating to Congress, and sometimes
do. But experience shows that—at least with a capaciously worded
statute—courts feel a practical imperative to perform that updating
role rather than simply apply administrative constraints ill suited to
serving congressional purposes in the face of changed realities.269
Administrative law’s transsubstantive nature, which means that the
effects of not gap-ﬁlling or updating would mean inadequate administrative controls across a wide range of executive branch activities,
reinforces judges’ inclinations for common law development. A similar
reinforcing effect comes from administrative law’s focus on the structures and procedures that lie at the heart of the administrative state,

266
George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges from
New Deal Politics, 90 Nw U L Rev 1557, 1560, 1662–63 (1996) (“As the bill’s enactment
became imminent, each party to the negotiations over the bill attempted to create legislative
history—to create a record that would cause future reviewing courts to interpret the new
statute in a manner that would favor the party.”).
267
See Sunstein, 107 Georgetown L J at 1653–56 (cited in note 194) (discussing the Court’s
adherence to such as Gray v Powell, 314 US 402 (1941) and NLRB v Hearst Publications, 322
US 111 (1944)); Green, Deconstructing at 134–38 (cited in note 232).
268
This paragraph and the next draw on ideas I set out at length in Metzger, 80 Geo Wash
L Rev at 1320–55 (cited in note 96).
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Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 Stan L Rev 1189, 1301–09 (1986).
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such as the court-agency relationship. Not only is this relationship
difﬁcult to capture comprehensively in statutes,270 but also courts
may view elaboration of judicial review doctrines as especially within
their bailiwick.
This structural character of administrative law closely relates to a
third feature that underlies the development of administrative common law: the quasi-constitutional character of ordinary administrative law. Administrative law plays a critical role in building out the
administrative state, and even more in domesticating the administrative state within the constitutional order. Although rarely judicially
acknowledged, the primary means by which courts have addressed
constitutional concerns about agencies’ powers has been through subconstitutional administrative law requirements, such as the requirement of reasoned decision making, rather than direct constitutional
scrutiny.271 Judicial development of administrative common law reﬂects this use of administrative law to address the constitutional tensions raised by the modern administrative state.
To be sure, that administrative common law may be practically
inevitable does not render it legitimate. But unlike earlier instances of
federal court lawmaking, administrative common law does not displace state law or alter the primary rules that govern private behavior.
Instead, it shares the focus on uniquely federal interests that marks
many legitimate forms of federal common law.272 Equally central,
most administrative common law has a statutory basis to which it is at
least loosely tethered, such as the judicial review provisions of the
APA. And, critically, to the extent it serves to implement separationof-powers concerns, administrative common law is part of the elaboration of constitutional requirements seen as lying at the core of the
judicial role today.

270
See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 107 Colum L Rev
1749, 1772–73 (2009).
271
For further development of this argument, see generally Gillian E. Metzger, Ordinary
Administrative Law as Constitutional Common Law, 110 Colum L Rev 479 (2010); see also
Emily S. Bremer, The Unwritten Administrative Constitution, 66 Fla L Rev 1217, 1218–19,
1234–48 (2014) (arguing that “administrative law has evolved into an unwritten constitution
that governs the administrative power not contemplated by the U.S. Constitution”). To
Justice Gorsuch’s credit, he acknowledged the role that subconstitutional doctrines play in
policing discretion in Gundy, 139 S Ct at 2141–42 (Gorsuch, J, dissenting) (discussing
vagueness and major questions doctrines as surrogates for delegation doctrine).
272

Texas Industries v Radcliffe Materials, Inc., 451 US 630, 640–41 (1981).
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III. Whither Roberts Court Administrative Law?
Focusing simply on these analytic themes and tensions, it is
hard to discern a clear direction for the Roberts Court on administrative law. The Court is at times formalist and at times nonformalist;
at times textualist and at times more common law in orientation. And
while its administrative law opinions have turned consistently more
historicist over recent years, that backward focus has encompassed a
range of approaches, from originalism to an emphasis on historical
practice and precedent. Greater coherence becomes apparent when
the Justices are viewed in their overall ideological groupings, and
some individual Justices are particularly consistent. But the Court as
a whole seems to vacillate in ways that resist principled explanation.
Instead, the factor that best explains Roberts Court administrative
law seems to be the varied administrative law jurisprudence of Chief
Justice Roberts himself.
Taking a step back, two broader frames emerge from the 2018
Terms decisions and the Roberts Court’s administrative law jurisprudence writ large. One is radical and could portend dramatic changes
in existing doctrine; the other is incrementalist and seemingly more
modulated in its reforms. The incrementalist approach dominated the
2018 Term administrative law decisions, and there are reasons to
think that may continue. But although these two approaches are analytically distinct, in practice both may result in similar pullbacks on
administrative authority. Moreover, both frames are united in one key
regard: increasing judicial supervision of administrative government.
And both convey the sense that the administrative state must be cabined to guard against unaccountable, aggrandized, and arbitrary administrative power. Notably absent across both is an afﬁrmative argument for the potential beneﬁts of administrative government, other
than recognition on the incrementalist side of the value of bureaucratic
expertise.
The lack of a more robust defense of the administrative state represents a substantial hole in Roberts Court administrative law jurisprudence. Failure to invoke the full range of potential beneﬁts from
administrative government makes Roberts Court administrative law
jurisprudence appear increasingly one-sided and political. Moreover,
a fuller picture of administrative government is needed if the Roberts
Court’s interventions are to yield a coherent approach to administrative law.
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a. radicalism and incrementalism in roberts court
administrative law
Viewing the analytic tensions described above in broader perspective, two methodological frames emerge from the Roberts Court’s
2018 administrative law decisions. What stands out in Justice Gorsuch’s Kisor opinion is the absolutist and categorical nature of his argument. He insists on the need for clear rules and rejects altogether
any claims of stare decisis.273 A similar absolutist and categorical
character typiﬁes Gorsuch’s approach in Gundy, with his insistence
on reviving direct constitutional barriers to delegation and unwillingness to address delegation concerns through more indirect and
subconstitutional means.
This uncompromising commitment to formalism, originalism, and
textualism—evident in Justice Thomas’s opinions as well—has potential to radically reshape existing doctrine and administrative institutions. It would require overruling Chevron and Auer deference, as
both Justices openly acknowledge, but the implications of this approach would extend well past deference doctrines. Taken categorically, without acceptance of patterns of governance that have emerged
over time, a formalist insistence on strict lines dividing legislative,
executive, and judicial power calls into question the combination of
rulemaking, enforcement, and adjudication that lies at the heart of
modern administrative agencies.274 Applying such a division, Gorsuch’s
and Thomas’s prior opinions have suggested they would pull administrative adjudication back to only covering matters of public right,
deﬁned in originalist terms.275 Asserting that original understandings
so require, they would also deem a broad swath of federal government
personnel to be principal or inferior ofﬁcers, thereby rendering a large
273
Compare Kisor, 139 S Ct at 2443–48 (Gorsuch, J, concurring in the judgment) (arguing
that stare decisis does not require retention of Auer), with Perez, 135 S Ct at 1212 (Scalia, J,
concurring in the judgment) (acknowledging that Chevron may be too established to be
overturned).
274
See Cass R. Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule, The Unbearable Rightness of Auer, 84 U Chi
L Rev 297, 298, 312 (2017).
275
See Oil States Energy Services, LLC v Greene’s Energy Group, LLC, 138 S Ct 1365, 1381–
82 (2018) (Gorsuch, J, dissenting) (arguing that system for administrative review of granted
patents was unconstitutional because granted patents were not considered matters of public
right at the founding); B&B Hardware, Inc. v Hargis Industries, Inc., 135 S Ct 1293, 1316
(2015) (Thomas, J, dissenting) (“Because federal administrative agencies are part of the
Executive Branch, it is not clear that they have power to adjudicate claims involving core
private rights.”).
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number unconstitutionally appointed.276 Meanwhile, requiring the
APA to be applied in accordance with its enacted text and original
meaning would not just overturn Chevron and Auer and entail a pullback
in arbitrariness review; it would also throw into doubt long-standing
doctrines that developed the procedural requirements of notice-andcomment rulemaking and access to judicial review.277
By contrast, Justice Kagan’s Kisor opinion is above all else incrementalist. Far from absolute, it instead emphasizes case-by-case analysis and a commitment to developing precedent and existing practice
rather than dramatic change. Such contextualized, precedent and
practice-based analysis has long characterized Justice Breyer’s administrative law opinions.278 And incrementalism was also on display
in Justice Kagan’s decision in Lucia v SEC, which ruled that ALJs
at the Securities and Exchange Commission were unconstitutionally
appointed inferior ofﬁcers. In so holding, Kagan wrote about as narrowly as possible, closely following existing precedent and refusing
to deﬁne inferior ofﬁcer more broadly or consider the scope of the
judges’ removal protection.279 Perhaps more importantly given his role
as the fulcrum of the Court on administrative law, Chief Justice Roberts’s administrative law opinions are often incrementalist as well.
Although the Chief Justice has advanced formalist principles with a
categorical edge, he has applied them in a minimalist manner that
substantially circumscribes their impact.280 Roberts’s penchant for
minimalism was particularly clear with his limited and selective join
in Kisor, which left the law versus policy and APA debates in the case
unresolved and instead focused on addressing his concerns about
Auer deference with minimal disruption to existing doctrine.
276
See Lucia v SEC, 138 S Ct 2044, 2056 (2018) (Thomas, J, concurring) (“The Founders
likely understood the term ‘Ofﬁcers of the United States’ to encompass all federal civil
ofﬁcials who perform an ongoing, statutory duty—no matter how important or signiﬁcant the
duty.”) (citation omitted).
277
See note 252 and its accompanying text (discussing arbitrary and capriciousness review);
American Radio Relay League v FCC, 524 F3d 227, 245–47 (DC Cir 2008) (Kavanaugh, J,
concurring) (arguing that current notice-and-comment requirements are not compatible with
the APA’s text as originally understood).
278
See Noel Canning, 573 US 513, 524 (2014) (Breyer, J) (emphasizing that “in interpreting
the [Recess Appointments] Clause, we put signiﬁcant weight upon historical practice”);
Barnhart v Walton, 535 US 212, 222 (2002) (Breyer, J) (arguing that Chevron deference is
appropriate based on consideration of multiple factors).
279
Lucia, 138 S Ct at 2051 (Kagan, J) (“The sole question here is whether the Commission’s
ALJs are ‘Ofﬁcers of the United States’ or simply employees of the Federal Government.”)
(emphasis added).
280

See text accompanying notes 209–10.
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In the contest between radicalism and incrementalism during the
2018 Term, incrementalism was the victor. This could in part be a
reﬂection of the fact that the 2018 Term was a transition year, with
Justice Kennedy’s resignation and Justice Kavanaugh replacing him
to create a solid conservative majority on the Court. Popular criticism
of the Court in response may have made Roberts in particular unwilling to adopt more radical positions, and fears that the new majority will overturn contentious precedents fueled the repeated debates over stare decisis.281 If this pattern continues in future Terms,
then the most radical attacks on the constitutionality of administrative governance may not gain majority support.
The counter is Gundy and the constitutionality of broad congressional delegations of authority to the executive branch. Despite his
incrementalism elsewhere, the Chief Justice signed onto Justice Gorsuch’s constitutional attack on broad delegations of authority to the
executive branch in Gundy—an attack that Justice Kagan described as
meaning that “most of Government is unconstitutional.”282 Each of
the ﬁve conservative Justices has now signaled willingness to reconsider the Court’s lenient nondelegation doctrine.283 Were the Court
to support signiﬁcant constitutional barriers to delegation, that would
be a sign of radicalism ascendant in Roberts Court administrative law.
However, it remains to be seen how far Roberts, Alito, and Kavanaugh are actually willing to go reviving limits on delegation. Their
same-Term endorsement of broad executive branch policy discretion
in Department of Commerce may signal that they will not go very far.
Previously, both Roberts and Kavanaugh have addressed excessivedelegation concerns through a statutory interpretation lens rather
than broad-scale constitutional invalidation, and they may opt to continue with such subconstitutional approaches going forward.284
281
Cf. Joan Biskupic, Chief Justice John Roberts Is Exercising the Power He’s Craved, CNN
Politics ( June 27, 2019), at https://www.cnn.com/2019/06/27/politics/john-roberts-supreme
-court/index.html.
282

139 S Ct at 2130 (Kagan, J) (plurality).
See id at 2131 (Gorsuch, J, joined by Roberts, CJ, and Thomas, J, dissenting) (arguing
for stricter constitutional limits on delegation); id at 2131 (Alito, J, concurring in the judgment) (signaling support for reconsidering “the approach we have taken [to nondelegation]
for the past 84 years”); Paul v United States, 140 S Ct 342 (2019) (Kavanaugh, J, statement on
denial of certiorari) (“Justice Gorsuch’s scholarly analysis of the Constitution’s nondelegation
doctrine . . . may warrant further consideration in future cases.”).
283

284
See King v Burwell, 135 S Ct 2480, 2483 (2015) (refusing to apply Chevron deference on
the grounds that “had Congress wished to assign” “a question of deep ‘economic and political
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Chief Justice Roberts’s past practice of building up to overruling
precedents over time rather than in one fell swoop also merits note.285
This might suggest that radical changes in administrative law may yet
occur, notwithstanding the 2018 Term’s incrementalism. Yet Roberts
has had opportunities to push for more radical administrative law
outcomes in the past and not pursued them—despite describing administrative government in stark terms that would seem to merit a
more dramatic response.286 Put differently, when it comes to bottomline results, Roberts’s anti-administrativism has often lost out to his
Burkean and common law instincts.
Crucially, however, even incrementalism can have a signiﬁcant
impact on existing administrative law and administrative institutions.
One need look no further than the aftermath of Kisor to see this effect.
In the four-month period after Kisor’s issuance, the courts of appeals
directly considered whether to apply Auer deference in light of Kisor
in thirty cases and deferred to the agency’s approach in only ten of
those. In an additional ﬁve cases, the court declined deference but
ultimately upheld the agency’s interpretation, for an overall rate of
the government prevailing 50 percent of the time.287 By comparison,
studies of the years leading up to Kisor have identiﬁed the courts as
granting Auer deference or the government as prevailing 71 percent
of the time.288 Similarly, despite their bottom-line minimalism, the
Court’s decisions on removal, the status of administrative law judges,
signiﬁcance’” to an agency “it surely would have done so expressly”); United States Telecommunications Association v FCC, 855 F3d 381, 419 (Kavanaugh, J, dissenting from denial of
en banc review) (arguing that for an agency to have authority to issue a “major agency rule[ ]
of great economic and political signiﬁcance . . . Congress must clearly authorize the agency
to do so”). Kavanaugh has noted that Gorsuch’s view would preclude the approach that Kavanaugh had previously articulated, of allowing Congress to delegate authority to an agency
“to decide [a] major policy question” if Congress does so “expressly and speciﬁcally.” Paul,
140 S Ct at ∗1.
285
For a discussion of Chief Justice Roberts’s minimalism in this vein, see generally Jamal
Greene, Maximinimalism, 38 Cardozo L Rev 623 (2016).
286
See Metzger, 131 Harv L Rev at 36, 47–48 (cited in note 11).
287
These numbers come from examining court of appeals and district court cases in the
Westlaw citing decisions database that cited Kisor between June 26, 2019 to October 26,
2019. A total of sixty-two cases cited Kisor, but only thirty directly considered whether to
apply Auer deference.
288
See Cynthia Barmore, Auer in Action: Deference After Talk America, 76 Ohio St L J 813,
825–27 (2015) (studying deference rates in the court of appeals between 2011 to 2014 and
ﬁnding deference rates fell from 82 percent in 2011–12 to 71 percent in 2013–14); Richard J.
Pierce, Jr. and Joshua Weiss, An Empirical Study of Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations of
Agency Rules, 63 Admin L Rev 515, 519–20 (2011) (ﬁnding that across 219 cases between 1999
and 2007, district and appellate courts granted Auer deference at a 76 percent rate); William
Yeatman, Note, An Empirical Defense of Auer Step Zero, 106 Geo L J 515, 547 (2018) (ﬁnding
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and the constitutionality of administrative adjudication have sparked
a slew of challenges to well-established features of the administrative
state.289 And, if widespread, statutory narrowing of delegated authority
in response to background delegation concerns could lead to a signiﬁcant pullback in agency authority. Hence, over time both the radical and incrementalist approaches may yield substantial change to
existing administrative law and a signiﬁcant pullback in administrative
governance.
A ﬁnal important factor determining the shape of administrative
law going forward is what happens in the federal appellate courts.
That is the level where most administrative law decisions are issued,
and where the ultimate impact of the Court’s interventions will be
determined. Chevron is the leading example; more than the decision
itself, it was subsequent actions by lower courts and Justice Scalia that
made Chevron canonical.290 Similarly, it will be how the lower courts
apply Kisor—whether they continue to treat it as signiﬁcantly narrowing but preserving Auer, or instead as essentially doing away with
Auer deference or only tweaking Auer at the margins—that will establish Kisor’s impact on administrative law in practice. The same
is true of Department of Commerce’s emphasis on weaker arbitrary and
capriciousness review of agency decision making. As a result, the
Trump administration’s efforts to stock the federal courts with antiadministrativist judges may well prove more important than Supreme
Court doctrine in transforming the shape of administrative law.
b. constraining the administrative state
It is also worth highlighting a central feature that, despite their
differences, the radical and incrementalist approaches share: Both
that the government prevailed at an overall rate of 74 percent in cases when the court invoked
Auer in the period 1993 to 2013, but only at a 71 percent rate after 2006).
289
See, for example, Seila Law LLC v Consumer Protection Bureau, 2019 WL 5281290 at ∗1
(US Oct 18, 2019) (asking the parties to address the severability of the CFPB from DoddFrank should it be found unconstitutional); Arthrex, Inc. v Smith & Nephew, Inc., 2019 WL
5616010, ∗1 (Fed Cir 2019) (holding that Administrative Patent Judges were improperly
appointed principal ofﬁcers); Collins v Mnuchin, 938 F3d 553, 563 (5th Cir 2019) (en banc)
(holding that the FHFA “for cause” removal protection was unconstitutional); Cochran v SEC,
2019 WL 1359252, at ∗1 (ND Tex 2019) (up on appeal before the 5th Circuit) (challenging
the constitutionality of the SEC’s ALJ’s removal protection. The 5th Circuit issued a preliminary injunction on the administrative proceedings until the case is resolved).
290
See Gary Lawson and Stephen Kam, Making Law out of Nothing at All: The Origins of the
Chevron Doctrine, 65 Admin L Rev 1, 33–73 (2013); Thomas W. Merrill, The Story of Chevron:
The Making of an Accidental Landmark, in Peter L. Strauss, ed, Administrative Law Stories 399
(Foundation, 2006).
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involve an assertion of greater judicial control over the administrative
state and justify that greater role for courts on concerns about the
dangers of expanding administrative power. Indeed, skepticism about
administrative government may well be the consistent driver animating Roberts Court administrative law, albeit given full sway under
Justice Gorsuch’s radicalism and tamped down under Justice Kagan’s
incrementalism.
A striking characteristic of many Roberts Court administrative law
opinions is their sharp rhetorical attack on the administrative state
and bureaucracy. Chief Justice Roberts deserves the top award for
the most pointed prose in this regard. His reference in Free Enterprise
to a “vast and varied federal bureaucracy” that “wields vast power and
touches almost every aspect of daily life” is a prime example, and his
description in City of Arlington v FCC of “hundreds of federal agencies
poking into every nook and cranny of daily life” is equally evocative.291 Several other Justices have made disparaging remarks about
the bureaucracy as well, often quoting Roberts’s language in Free Enterprise. Justice Gorsuch in particular repeatedly positions judges as
the protectors of “the unpopular and vulnerable” against “bureaucrats”292 and “a bureaucrat’s caprice.”293 He echoed these sentiments to
some extent in Kisor, invoking the administrative state’s “explosive
growth,” and “self-interested” bureaucrats with shifting whims.”294
But the 2018 Term decisions were relatively tame and balanced on
the rhetorical front, with Chief Justice Roberts in particular holding
his ﬁre. Perhaps the attacks on the “deep state” that currently dominate the political arena convinced the Justices that similar bureaucracy bashing by the Court would be inappropriate.295
Instead, what surfaced clearly in the 2018 Term opinions was a
more principled debate over the relevance of bureaucratic expertise.
As noted above, both Justice Kagan in Kisor and Justice Breyer in
Department of Commerce portrayed expertise as a central beneﬁt of
administrative government and one that administrative law doctrine
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Free Enterprise Fund, 561 US at 499; City of Arlington, 569 US at 315.

292

Oil States, 138 S Ct at 1381 (Gorsuch, J, dissenting).

293

Biestek v Berryhill, 139 S Ct 1148, 1163 (2019) (Gorsuch, J, dissenting).
Kisor, 139 S Ct at 2432, 2442, 2446 (Gorsuch, J, dissenting).
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295
For a description of that political battle, which has become even more prominent in the
impeachment inquiry, see Peter Baker et al, Trump’s War on the “Deep State” Turns Against
Him, NY Times (Oct 23, 2019), at https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/23/us/politics/trump
-deep-state-impeachment.html.
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should be tailored to foster. Thus, Kagan precluded Auer deference
from applying to administrative interpretations of regulations that
did not “in some way implicate its substantive expertise” while Breyer
relied heavily on the contrary and documented views of agency experts in concluding that Ross’s decision was arbitrary and capricious.296 By contrast, Justice Gorsuch elevated judicial expertise over
that of bureaucrats, arguing that it was ultimately for courts to weigh
“the expert agency’s views” against “competing expert and other evidence supplied in an adversarial setting.”297 And Chief Justice Roberts
insisted on the primacy of an agency’s political ofﬁcials over its experts,
emphasizing that agency decisions are legitimately driven by political
priorities. This is a point Roberts has made before, most notably arguing in Free Enterprise that “[o]ne can have a government that functions without being ruled by functionaries, and a government that
beneﬁts from expertise without being ruled by experts.”298 Justice Thomas also has voiced skepticism of arguments for deference
based on administrative expertise, identifying them as misplaced and
historically rooted in the progressives’ “belief that bureaucrats might
more effectively govern the country than the American people.”299
Yet these disagreements over bureaucratic expertise should not
obscure the similarities in these accounts. All the Justices ended up
supporting greater judicial scrutiny of administrative decision making in some form, whether by restricted deference to agency interpretations, heightened scrutiny of agency policy determinations, or
both. As signiﬁcant, they did so invoking the need to guard against
the danger of excessive administrative power. Even Justice Kagan in
Kisor argued “that administrative law doctrines must take account of
the far-reaching inﬂuence of agencies and the opportunities such
power carries for abuse.”300 Granted, what the Justices view as the
danger posed by expanded administrative government varies in important ways. As I have previously argued, at times Justices stress the
danger of aggrandized administrative power threatening individual
liberty, and at others the fear is that administrative power is politically
296
Kisor, 139 S Ct at 2417 (Kagan, J) (plurality); Department of Commerce, 139 S Ct at 2587–
93 (Breyer, J, concurring and dissenting in part).
297
298

Kisor, 139 S Ct at 2442–43 (Gorsuch, J, concurring in the judgment).
Free Enterprise Fund, 561 US at 499.
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Perez, 135 S Ct at 1223 n 6 (Thomas, J, concurring).
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Kisor, 139 S Ct at 2423 (Kagan, J) (plurality).
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unaccountable.301 In Department of Commerce Justice Breyer suggested
a different account, implying that the real danger was too much political control of administrative power,302 while the Chief Justice focused on the traditional concern that exercise of administrative power
must be reasoned and not arbitrary.303 And in Kisor and Gundy, Justice
Gorsuch repeatedly portrayed administrative power as biased as well
as aggrandized, worsening the threat to individual liberty.304 Despite
these differences, the consistent theme is of the potential dangers of
administrative government.
Notably lacking from the 2018 Term decisions, and from Roberts
Court administrative law generally, is a robust defense of the administrative state. The contribution that bureaucratic expertise makes
to better decision making and effective government is a central beneﬁt
of administrative agencies.305 But administrative agencies serve other
critical functions too. Bureaucracy works to constrain as well as empower government, through close supervision and enforcement of
legal controls on government actors. Administrative government is
also essential for ensuring political accountability; it is agencies implementing statutes through regulations and enforcement that put
democratically adopted policy into operation.306 And administrative
agencies are equally important to securing individual liberty, by protecting individuals against abuses of private power and ensuring access to the basic goods (safe food, a clean environment, protection
against private exploitation, and so on) needed for a full and free life.
The D.C. Circuit underscored this point recently in its en banc majority opinion in PHH Corporation v CFPB. There, in rejecting the
claim that a single-headed agency with removal protection posed a
greater threat to individual liberty than a multimember commission,
Judge Pillard emphasized the liberty beneﬁts of ﬁnancial regulation:
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Metzger, 131 Harv L Rev at 36–38 (cited in note 11).
Department of Commerce, 139 S Ct at 2589–90, 2592–93, 2595 (Breyer, J, concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
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Id at 2575–76.
Kisor, 139 S Ct at 2425, 2432, 2439, 2446–47 (Gorsuch, J, concurring in the judgment);
Gundy, 139 S Ct at 2131 (Gorsuch, J, dissenting).
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It is also an administrative feature under increased threat. See Brad Plumer and Coal
Davenport, Science Under Attack: How Trump Is Sidelining Researchers and Their Work, NY
Times (Dec 28, 2019), at https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/28/climate/trump-administration
-war-on-science.html.
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It remains unexplained why we would assess the challenged removal restriction with reference to the liberty of ﬁnancial providers, and not more
broadly to the liberty of individuals and families who are their customers. . . .
Congress understood that markets’ contribution to human liberty derives
from freedom of contract, and that such freedom depends on market participants’ access to accurate information, and on clear and reliably enforced
rules against fraud and coercion.307

For that matter, ﬁnancial regulation also advances liberty interests of
regulated parties, for example by guarding against abusive tactics that
can wreak ﬁnancial havoc or destroy consumer trust in an industry.
What would a fuller defense of administrative government have
looked like in the 2018 Term administrative law decisions? In Department of Commerce, more emphasis could have been put on how
the Census Bureau’s actions represented an internal bureaucratic
effort to reinforce democracy and the rule of law. Policy setting by
top political appointees is certainly an important form of political
accountability, as Chief Justice Roberts insisted. But there is surely
also a political accountability beneﬁt to resisting actions by political
leaders that threaten the basic representative structure of our political system, as well as an important rule-of-law value in ensuring
that political leaders do not abuse government power for partisan
gain. In Kisor, it could have meant more of an argument for interpretive deference precisely because such deference allows agencies to
interpret ambiguous regulations in ways that they believe will best
advance their regulatory goals. Although for Gorsuch this amounts
to self-serving and liberty-threatening bias, that assumes that public
agencies are no different than private parties. A more robust defense
of administrative government would reject that equation, and instead emphasize how effective implementation of statutes and regulations can be liberty enhancing and in the public interest. The same
liberty-enhancing argument could have been developed in defense
of broad delegations in Gundy; such delegations can enhance liberty
by ensuring that government is able to respond quickly and effectively to new private abuses of power as they arise. In fairness, Justice
Breyer’s and Kagan’s opinions hinted at these arguments, with Breyer
mentioning the importance of an accurate census to democracy and
307
PHH Corp. v Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 881 F3d 75, 106 (DC Cir 2018) (en
banc); see also id at 105–06 (arguing in addition that if “a removal restriction leaves the
President adequate control of the executive branch’s functions,” courts do not undertake a
separate inquiry into the restriction’s impact on liberty).
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Kagan underscoring agencies’ knowledge and value to Congress.308
But for the most part they emphasized neutral-sounding administrative expertise and did not develop a broader account of how the
administrative state reinforces the constitutional order.
Failing to note these potential beneﬁts leads to a one-sided portrayal of the administrative state as inherently a threat to democracy,
rule of law, and liberty. And this one-sidedness in turn suggests that
the ultimate goal of Roberts Court administrative law may be to
pull back on government on ideological and political grounds, rather
than because doing so advances constitutional values or some other
principled basis. That perception should be a concern even for conservative Justices who are deeply skeptical of administrative government. As important, a more balanced account of agencies’ strengths
and weaknesses is needed for the Roberts Court to develop a coherent approach to administrative law. Absent a more sophisticated
and nuanced understanding of administrative government, the Roberts Court’s administrative law decisions are unlikely to rise above
the level of ad hoc and occasionally inconsistent interventions.

308
Department of Commerce, 139 S Ct at 2584–85, 2595 (Breyer, J, concurring in part and
dissenting in part); Kisor, 139 S Ct at 2413 (Kagan, J) (plurality); Gundy, 139 S Ct at 2130
(Kagan, J) (plurality).

